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THE POPULAR IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER:
SOME THOUGHTS ON ITS EIGHTEENTH AND
NINETEENTH CENTURY INTELLECTUAL BASES
JAMES W. GORDON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have always had ambivalent feelings about lawyers. Almost
every generation has expressed its distaste for this profession which lives by
subtlety and conflict, but each generation has put its most important public
and private affairs into the hands of persons trained to the law. This fact
is true whether one looks to positions of private or public power. Nowhere
has the bar been so heavily criticized and in no other place have its members
had such honors and power bestowed upon them.
Almost forty years ago, James Willard Hurst noted the ambiguous
position of the lawyer in American society when he observed: "Whether
mistaken, unjust, or hypocritical, the unfavorable popular image of the
lawyer was a reality throughout our social history. It contrasted oddly with
the people's readiness to make a place at the bar an object of public honor
and private ambition."' What are the sources of this ambivalence? What
intellectual currents have produced such mixed and yet such intense feelings?
This essay will explore the ambiguous position lawyers occupy in the
popular mind in America by identifying some of the ideas which contributed
to the schizophrenic popular attitude toward the legal profession in the
period between the American Revolution and the Civil War. Many of the
stock anti-lawyer themes and many of the intellectual sources of the profes-
sion's strength are clearly visible by the end of this period. I propose to
explore this problem, first by relating it to recent scholarship in American
history describing the struggle between republicanism and liberalism at the
time of the Founding. The way the profession was ground between these
ideals, attacked by one, championing and then apparently betraying the
goals of the other, illustrates well the process which has shaped the image
of lawyers in the United States.
Other points of contact have contributed to the complexity of lay
attitudes toward lawyers. Some illustrated the usefulness of lawyers. Many
produced resentment. Still others did both, depending on the perspective of
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the viewer. Among the points I will discuss are attitudes toward change,
autonomy, reason, human nature, and law itself. Ultimately, I will argue
that although lawyers were more hated than loved, their indispensability
was widely recognized.
Americans' attitude toward change colored attitudes toward law and
lawyers. For republicans, change brought decline. They feared it, and
believed lawyers to be among its most effective proponents. Lawyers became
for agrarian republicans one of the most important symbols of moderni-
zation in the early republic. Because lawyers and the adversary system they
served were at the cutting edge of the liberal displacement of republicanism,
this republican fear was grounded, at least partially, in fact. The bar
espoused values which were extremely individualistic, and the legal changes
which suffused the law in the first half of the nineteenth century helped
accelerate the explicit developments late eighteenth century republicans most
feared. Republicans imagined that lawyers, in pursuit of their professional
interests or as agents of others, worked relentlessly at undermining the
social and economic bases of republicanism. There was some truth to this
charge.
2
The republican perception was a powerful source of anti-lawyer senti-
ment in the early republic. However, as change in American society accel-
erated in the first half of the nineteenth century management of change
became critically important. Common lawyers had always mediated and
concealed change. Law and lawyers met this need by providing necessary
continuity and stability. The law in their hands incorporated change while
maintaining contact with the past. Even dramatic changes in society and
particularly in the economy could be accommodated by relatively small
changes in legal doctrine. If nineteenth century America was a society
undergoing a truly revolutionary transformation, law and lawyers cloaked
many of the changes in evolutionary language. By doing so, lawyers satisfied
a deep conservative desire for order in an increasingly chaotic world.
3
As champions of liberal individualism, the legal profession drew strength
from the emerging, dominant economic and political ideology of the United
States. What agitated republicans, earned respect from liberals. Lawyers
spoke for the victors. The ascendancy of lawyers and the multiplication of
laws which accompanied the triumph of liberalism, however, eventually
undercut individual autonomy, the most important of the benefits promised
by liberalism. Legal complexity and the emergence of legal constraints on
personal action divided lawyers from their liberal allies.
The post-Enlightenment apotheosis of reason encouraged the entrusting
of decisionmaking to reasoning men, and lawyers proclaimed their expertise
in this field. Many, however, believed this a false claim. Often Americans
2. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); W.
NELSON, TH AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: T1E IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).
3. See M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELEF 33-56 (1960).
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were tempted to attack the intricacies and complexities of the common law,
most of which the bar defended. If this strange product of lawyers' reasoning
called the common law was irrational, either legal reasoning was sophistic
or lawyers were dishonest. If the common law method was false, lawyers
were guilty either of ignorance or hypocrisy, and possibly of a conspiracy
against laymen as well. The cost of legal representation and the disempow-
erment which accompanied litigation reinforced these suspicions. It was a
small step to the conclusion that lawyers served no one but themselves.
The difference between lawyer and nonlawyer conceptions of law rein-
forced initial discomfort. The lay idea of law rested upon a natural law
foundation and led nonlawyers to view lawyer manipulation of positivist
legal principles as further evidence of dishonesty and selfishness. Yet, despite
this tension lawyers consolidated their private and public power. The ele-
vation of the profession was completed when the lawyers consolidated their
monopoly on law during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The profession was able to elevate itself partly because the triumph of
liberal individualism made the restraint provided by law indispensable.
Having undermined other institutions which traditionally had served to tame
the passions of man, Americans were left with nothing but law to serve
this function. With the accelerating decline of communal institutions during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, law, which had always been peculiarly
important in America, became indispensable. Since Americans could not
trust their neighbors, they were forced to depend on lawyers.
The profession made this reality more palatable to nonlawyers by
convincing egalitarian-minded nineteenth century Americans that the bar's
apparent elitism could be removed by opening it to anyone with talent. By
persuading the Jacksonians that those who succeeded at the bar were worthy
exemplars of emerging democratic principles and the accompanying Amer-
ican belief in the self-made man, the bar fought off a serious challenge to
its special status and consolidated its position. This new professional egal-
itarianism, however, was a formula for the sharing of power among members
of a more democratic profession. It was not a promise of equality between
lawyers and laymen.
I do not mean to suggest that the abstractions I will discuss in this
essay explain all criticism of the legal profession. Surely, direct experience
with particular lawyers and with the adversary system accounted for some
anti-lawyer sentiment. Many people must have experienced the legal system
into which they were cast as incomprehensible, infuriating, frightening, and
expensive. Since lawyers are the main channel through which nonlawyers
experience our legal system, it is not surprising that lawyers have received
the blame for that system's unpleasant features. It is a strange system.
Lawyer champions fight, but when blows strike home, their clients bleed.
It is easy to understand why a lay person who has experienced the adversary
system directly may emerge from the encounter with a clear recollection of
Justice's blindfold and little confidence in the quality of her scales.
My intention is not to minimize the part such experiences play in
creating bar critics. For most of our history as a nation, however, only a
19891
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small percentage of the people alive at any given moment have had direct,
professional contact with lawyers. This inescapable fact means that most
Americans' perceptions of the bar have been shaped not by direct experience,
but by the repute of the profession and by abstractions about lawyers.
Popular attacks on the bar and the rage these attacks express amplify
and reverberate not because critic and listener share a common wretched
experience, but because the critic's complaint taps a popular hostility toward
lawyers which is not the result of experience. Here is the realm of ideas.
Why have so many people without direct experience of lawyers been so
ready to believe the worst about the legal profession? Equally perplexing is
the complementary question: why do our countrymen abide and promote
lawyers if Americans have so low an opinion of the bar? Answering both
of these questions is the focus of this essay.4
II. UNCOVERING A "CULTURAL FAULT"
A. Community Versus Individualism
In a recent thoughtful essay on the dark image of lawyers in America,
Robert Post examined some of the literary and psychological sources of
antilawyer sentiment. Post suggested that the reasons for hostility toward
lawyers should be sought along the "fault line" of the value conflict
Americans experience as they struggle to reconcile an individual focused,
competitive society with their longing for community. They want the free-
dom to get and keep, and to live selfishly without regard for the claims all
may have upon each. But Americans .also want the security of family-like
interactions. As Post put it: "The lawyer is the public and unavoidable
4. The reader is due one further word of explanation concerning the assumptions upon
which this essay rests. I have attempted to generalize my discussion beyond the limits of the
period I cover so as to address attitudes toward the legal profession over time. Generalization
always carries with it the risk of oversimplification. I am certainly aware that both the
profession and American society have changed in dramatic ways since the middle of the
nineteenth century. Also one must recognize that all ideas, including republicanism and
liberalism, are organic.
Neither am I blind to the dangers created by moving freely back and forth among
eighteenth and nineteenth century materials. However, it was not my intention to describe
popular attitudes toward lawyers at any one time or place. Rather, I have tried to understand
the sources and to integrate examples of popular ambivalence toward lawyers in general.
It will be clear to the reader that I also have assumed that contextually-based attitudes
may persist even after the specific framework of ideas within which they originated has receded
into historical memory. In particular, I have assumed that ideas originating in a republican
world view left a cultural residue which helped to shape American cultural attitudes in the
same way that childhood experiences shape adult personality. The adult is not always aware
of the lattice of early experiences which constitutes a source of adult attitudes or opinions,
but the connection is real and its reconstruction can help in understanding or explaining that
adult's behavior. Ideas have a specific context, but they also become historical facts in that
they affect subsequent generations upon whom they are imperfectly imprinted or to whom
they are imperfectly transmitted.
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embodiment of the tension we all experience between the desire for an
embracing and common community and the urge toward individual inde-
pendence and self-assertion. .... . 5
Post's hypothesis resonates powerfully with the central theme of Jerold
Auerbach's provocative book, Justice Without Law?.6 Auerbach observes
that law and lawyers moved to the center of American life only after the
dissolution of community.7
Auerbach argues that unless Americans can recapture what he calls a
"coherent community vision," laymen will continue to suffer a self-imposed
captivity to the legal profession, while brooding upon and lamenting the
bar's power.' Although he does not offer the analogy, one cannot help
comparing the social fragmentation that Auerbach describes to the disso-
lution of individual families through divorce. Just as isolated individuals
turn to lawyers for the regulation of their human relations when community
has fled, so do spouses as they reproduce the disintegration of the larger
family in the microcosm of the smaller. If, as Auerbach argues, "the law
begins where community ends," 9 then we should scarcely wonder that
Americans experience and articulate a profound ambivalence about lawyers.
Law is for strangers, and those who believe that our society should offer
more than isolation to its constituents flinch at entering the lawyer's realm
and hate the lawyer for living there with so little apparent discomfort. Both
Post and Auerbach seem to agree that lawyers are indispensable to a
particular kind of society: one which Auerbach would characterize as
fragmented and pernicious. One may note that the society he criticizes has
always drawn fire from numbers of Americans who believe it to be badly
out of joint.
The two ideals discussed by Post and Auerbach have taken concrete
form in American history in competing models pitting individualism against
community-the intellectual tradition represented by modern liberalism against
the competing intellectual tradition of republicanism.10
5. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CAIF'.
L. REv. 379, 389 (1987).
6. J. AUERBACH, JUSnTCE WrrHoUT LAW? (1983).
7. Id. at 6, 69-94. Auerbach argues that Americans, as a people, have paid a price for
their denial of a cooperative communitarian vision, a vision which has survived against great
odds throughout American history. He discusses four historical examples of communities which
functioned without law and lawyers. He observes that each had a powerful commitment to
the value of community and so did not need them.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 5.
10. See J. APPLEBY, CAPrrALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: Tan REPUBLIcAN VIsIoN OF
THlE 1790's (1984); J. DiGmNs, THE LOST SoUL OF AMERICAN POLITCs: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST,
AND TnE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM 3-145 (1984); L. HARa-z, Tam LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMmRICAN PoLmIcA THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955);
Appleby, Introduction: Republicanism and Ideology, 37 AM. Q. 461 (1985); Diggins, Comrades
and Citizens: New Mythologies in American Historiography, 90 AM. HIST. REv. 614 (1985);
Smith, Liberalism, in 9 INTERNATIoNAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 276. The most
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B. Liberal Individualism and Republican Communitarianism
1. Rediscovering Republicanism
Students of American society have been attuned to the presence and
importance of the individualism-liberalism strand in American culture for a
long time. No one questions its significance in understanding who we are.
In contrast, the communitarian strand of our intellectual tradition has been
largely ignored until recently. Only those American historians interested in
communitarian utopianism studied this cooperative, if eccentric, counter-
model of social organization. This changed dramatically in the mid-1960's
when mainline intellectual historians in a series of provocative monographs
rediscovered the communitarian-republican ideology of the revolutionary
generation. Attempts since then to trace the influence of the republican
tradition in later periods of American history have brought historians to a
watershed, and have precipitated an ongoing scholarly debate over the
relative importance of these competing paradigms in understanding Ameri-
can history. About one thing all must agree. Both of these paradigms, as
well as others, have been at work in shaping the deep cultural attitudes of
most Americans." The performance of lawyers in America has generated
hostility from both intellectual camps. In the eyes of republicans, lawyers
destroyed community by encouraging and serving individual selfishness.
More importantly, lawyers undermined the foundations of republicanism by
promoting change and modernization. In the eyes of liberals, lawyers first
helped to liberate individuals from state control and then undermined the
resulting freedom by creating a web of law which eventually reenslaved
them. For republicans, the legal profession was always an enemy, though
individual lawyers could be friends. For liberals, the legal profession could
be a partner, a servant, and a master, all at the same time. The liberal
opinion of lawyers was much more ambivalent and changeable than that of
republicans because it depended upon which facet of the liberal relationship
with lawyers was prominent in a particular context. Republican ideas fueled
much of the anti-lawyer sentiment in the early republic. Liberal ideas led
to a much more complex relationship with the bar. This relationship always
contained a strange mixture of respect and contempt, of trust and anxiety.
important discussion of the republican tradition remains G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERicAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). See also J. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); Ross, The
Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed, NEw DRECTIONs IN
AMERiCAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 116 (1979). The continuing scholarly discussion about the
importance of these competing intellectual strands in the early history of America highlights
the importance of both. See Onuf, Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography
in Bicentennial Perspective, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 341 (1989).
11. See Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics
in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 9 (1987) (for a thoughtful discussion
of this idea).
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Lawyers came to represent both what was best and worst about the emerging
liberal philosophy.
Liberal historians, with their emphasis on the influence of John Locke,
natural rights, and the Enlightenment, dominated the historiography on the
American Revolution and the early development of the United States until
the mid-1960's. Beginning with the work of Pauline Maier, J.G.A. Pocock,
Bernard Bailyn, and especially Gordon Wood, however, the history of the
Imperial Crisis between Britain and the American colonies, the Founding,
and nineteenth century America, have been radically rewritten. Without
entirely denying the importance of Locke and the liberal tradition in the
development of the United States, these authors and others who have
followed their lead have identified another, and in their view more important
theme in the writings of eighteenth and early nineteenth century Americans.
This competing theme was republicanism. Republicanism was a distinc-
tive blend of classical, Renaissance, and English "Country" thought. Eight-
eenth century Americans imbibed this mix of ideas by reading Machiavelli,
seventeenth century English revolutionaries, and the writings of the early
eighteenth century opponents of the centralization of Parliamentary power
and the expansion of commerce under Robert Walpole.12
The conflict between scholars emphasizing the influence of republicanism
on American intellectual and political development on the one hand, and
those scholars arguing for renewed attention to the influence of a refor-
mulated liberalism on the other, has generated in recent years a sometimes
shrill debate among American intellectual historians. 3
2. Virtue, Autonomy, and Their Enemies
The classical republican tradition, as shaped by those who transmitted
it to America and as adapted by the Americans who received it, generally
emphasized civic responsibility, selfless service to the polity, and the necessity
of a virtuous citizenry. The heart of republicanism was communitarian. It
focused upon the duties owed by individuals to the political community
rather than on the enforcement of rights belonging to individuals against
the community. "'[R]epublicanism," wrote Dorothy Ross, "understood pol-
itics to be the chief end of human life and the arena in which men exercised
12. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); L.
BANNING, TiE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); J. POCOCK,
supra note 10; G. WOOD, supra note 10.
13. See L. BANNING, supra note 12; Banning, The Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited:
Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 4 (1986); J.
APPLEBY, supra note 10; Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY
Q. 20 (1986) (for an example of the disagreement); see Conklin, Comment on Diggins,
Comrades and Citizens: New Mythologies in American Historiography, 90 AM. Hisr. REV.
639 (1985); Diggins' Reply, 90 Am. HIST. REv. 644 (1985) (for an example of heat). See
Kloppenberg, supra note I1.; Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion". The Discourse of
Politics in 1787, 45 Wim. & MARY Q. 3 (1988) (for a constructive synthesis).
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and perfected their moral personality." 1 4 In order to maximize personal
satisfaction, man, as a social animal, must participate in public life and
pursue the public good.
Underlying and indispensable to this ideal was economic independence.
Only those who possessed sufficient property-usually perceived as produc-
tive land-were independent and autonomous enough to fulfill this obliga-
tion of citizenship. 5 Of course, property ownership was also important to
assure that those with a material stake in society would have control of
public decisions. If a man were subject economically to the will of another,
he was also politically dependent. Alexander Hamilton made this point
explicitly in The Federalist: "There are men who could neither be distressed
nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth
of few soils; and in the main it will be found that a power over a man's
support is a power over his will.' ' 6
Unless a man was economically self-sufficient, he was unable to exercise
independent judgment, and therefore unable to participate appropriately in
the public life of the republic. Corruption, the great subverter of republics,
was spawned as much by economic dependency as by excessive wealth. One
man or group "bought" other men's loyalty and political support by
appealing to individual selfishncss. This corruption was accomplished through
offers of economic rewards or office. By subverting a man's independence
and his inclination to exercise his judgment in the pursuit of the public
good, anti-republican factions arose to threaten liberty and the life of the
republic.
Economic self-sufficiency was important not only as a means to the
end of political autonomy. The possession of enough land to assure self-
sufficiency was also an important end in itself for republicans. Close
association with the soil, the farming, and management of land taught
habits of simplicity, frugality, and personal independence.' 7 The cultivation
of land resulted in the cultivation of private virtue. "Public virtue" rested
upon private virtue, and consequently, perpetuating private virtue was
14. Ross, Liberalism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMEICAN POLnTICAL HISTORY 750, 753 (J.
Green ed., 1984).
15. Drew McCoy, the leading historian of republican political economy, made this point
clearly when he wrote:
American republicans valued property in land primarily because it provided personal
independence. The individual with direct access to the productive resources of nature
need not rely on other men, or any man, for the basic means of existence.... The
personal independence that resulted from the ownership of land permitted a citizen
to participate responsibly in the political process, for it allowed him to pursue
spontaneously the common or public good, rather than the narrow interest of the
men-or the government-on whom he depended for his support.
D. McCoy, Tm ELusIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERCA 68 (1980).
See also J. POCOCK, supra note 10, at 423-461.
16. THE FEDERALiST No. 73, at 441 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
17. See Crevecoeur's sentimental discussion of the effects of farming and contact with
the soil. J. CREvEcoEuR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 35-64 (1782, Dutton ed. 1957).
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believed essential to the survival of republican government.' 8 Manufacturing,
commerce, and government debt were thought to be destructive of both
virtue and autonomy because they worked to separate citizens from the
land.
Republican values and the virtue necessary to their preservation were
epitomized by Cincinnatus in Republican Rome and by George Washington
in Revolutionary America. 9 Neither sought power over his fellows but
neither refused the community his time, his property, and even his life
when the needs of the republic demanded service and sacrifice. The virtues
that both of these men displayed were rooted in close association with the
land, in the simple virtues learned from agrarian pursuits, and the habits
of economic and social independence these pursuits generated.
20
Republicanism's enemy was manufacturing and commerce-though not
all commerce 2 '-because, as Thomas Jefferson wrote, these vocations made
men "depend[ent] . . . on [the] casualties and caprice of customers."' ' The
pursuit of wealth and enervating luxuries lured men to the pursuit of self-
interest and the engrossing of power over their fellow men. This kind of
economy fostered dependency in most men by making them subject to the
economic will of others. It also separated common people from the land
and pushed them into wretched cities which would become like those of
Europe. Once deprived of economic autonomy, men could no longer main-
18. "Virtue" was a critically important concept for republicans but it was something of
a chameleon, and historians have had difficulty agreeing upon its precise definition. Part of
the current debate about the period of the Founding involves serious disagreements about the
content of terms like virtue, republicanism, and liberalism in their late eighteenth century
incarnations. The best definition of virtue is that offered by Gordon Wood and restated
succinctly by Lance Banning. Wood defined "public virtue" as the "willingness of the individual
to sacrifice his private interests for the good of the community." G. WOOD, supra note 10,
at 68. In his book on the ideology of the Jeffersonian Republicans in the 1790's, Banning
wrote: "The image of a republic, in this age was most tellingly conveyed by the word 'virtue,'
which suggested a powerful, communitarian sense of the common good, an individual readiness
to sacrifice selfish interest for the interest of the whole." L. BANNING, supra note 12, at 107
(1978).
Forrest McDonald has defined public virtue more broadly. For McDonald, virtue
entailed firmness, courage, endurance, industry, frugal living, strength, and, above
all, unremitting devotion to the weal of the public's corporate self, the community
of virtuous men. It was at once individualistic and communal: individualistic in that
no member of the public could be dependent upon any other and still be reckoned
a member of the public; communal in that every man gave himself totally to the
good of the public as a whole.
F. McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: Tim INTELLECTUAL OIGINS OF TiE CONSTITUTION 70-
71 (1985). See also D. McCoy, supra note 15, at 6-7, 68-75, 77-80.
19. See G. WILs, CINCIiNATUs: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1984).
20. See T. JEFFERsoN, NoTEs ON Ti STATE OF VIRGINIA 156-58 (Harper Torchbook ed.
1964).
21. Appleby and McCoy both argue that commerce in agricultural surpluses was consid-
ered good because it supported an agrarian based society. See D. McCoy, supra note 15; J.
APPLEBY, supra note 10, at 39-50, 87-92.
22. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 20, at 157.
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tain their political independence and would be forced to put personal interest
above the public interest.
23
A non-agrarian economy destroyed not only the economic and political
autonomy of citizens, it also sapped their virtue. As men lost contact with
the land, they lost also the virtuous habits of industry and productive work.
In place of these habits, men learned to be self-concerned, to consume, to
dominate, and to put unrepublican barriers between themselves and their
fellow countrymen. For many of the revolutionary generation, the survival
of liberty and the republic which protected it depended on the preservation
of individual economic autonomy and the continuance of an agrarian
society.
3. Virtueless Lawyers
How did men who embraced this republican world view look upon
lawyers? "[T]he more radical brand of Country thought ... had always
regarded lawyers as a plague and a threat to virtue.''24 In the view of these
republicans, lawyers lived lives devoid of virtue. Lawyers were completely
dependent on others for their bread. Wits and knowledge of the law
constituted a lawyer's only capital. The commodity they sold was them-
selves. 25
23. See D. McCoy, supra note 15, at 36-39. See also the discussion of limiting suffrage
to freeholders which took place in the federal constitutional convention on August 7, 1787. 2
FARRAND, Tim RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 201-205 (1966). Gouverneur
Morris there argued:
Give the votes to the people who have no property, and they will sell them to the
rich who will be able to buy them .... The time is not distant when this Country
will abound with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread from their
employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty?... Children
do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their
own. The ignorant & dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest.
2 M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 203-204 (1966).
Although Madison believed it would be impolitic to restrict the suffrage, on the merits
he agreed with Morris.
Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the
safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the
people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of, property. These will
either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case, the
rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which
is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case
there will be equal danger on another side.
Id. at 203-204.
24. A. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAwyERs: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA
LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810 xviii (1981).
25. This is obviously not the way the profession sees itself. The codes of professional
conduct have always mixed injunctions of loyalty to clients with exhortations to exercise
independent professional judgment. See G. SHARswooD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE
AIMs AND DuTEs OF THE LAW (1854); AMERIcAN BAR AssOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs Canons 6, 15 (1908); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIrY Canon 5 (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.16 (1987). In practice, however,
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What republicans viewed as corruption-a fall from independence into
subordination, the commitment of one's self to the will of another-lawyers
chose as a way of life. This descent from independence was the result of
choosing to serve self-interest instead of the common interest. Lawyers
consciously abandoned virtue when they entered the profession. The poten-
tial for destruction was great. In pursuing their own moral decline, lawyers
promoted the destruction of morality in others. The means by which lawyers
profited from their own selfishness was to encourage selfishness in their
clients. Those republicans who read Blackstone's Commentaries would un-
doubtedly have seen a clear relationship between the increase of laws and
lawyers and the decline of virtue.
26
This view of lawyers was compounded by the belief that their choice
to serve private ends-their clients' and their own-was unprincipled. Law-
yers worked for money, not because they believed their work promoted the
common good. 27 Lawyers promoted extreme individualism because asserting
individualist values would increase clashes between the isolated individuals
who would inhabit a post-communitarian world. All parties involved in such
collisions would need legal representation. The bar would be paid well, over
and over again, for its attendance at the birth of such a society. Having
fostered chaos, lawyers could reap its fruits. They could batten upon
collisions when collisions occurred, profit by selling their expertise in avoid-
ing collisions. 28 Critics of the legal profession have found this indictment
persuasive. Lawyers, the critics charged, were guilty of intellectual prosti-
tution. Members of the bar encouraged social dissention in order to profit
from it.
Benjamin Austin, an articulate republican critic of the profession, first
published his views on the subject in 1786 in a series of newspaper essays
which he signed "Honestus." In 1819, Austin republished all of the letters
in pamphlet form entitled Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the
for most lawyers the duty of loyalty represents a higher law within the Codes. The profession's
inclination in this direction is reinforced by the lawyer's economic stake in retaining clients.
So long as the client does not involve the lawyer in clearly illegal activity, the lawyer is
enjoined to serve faithfully.
26. See D. BooRsmi, THE MYsTERIous SCIENCE OF THE LAw: AN ESSAY ON BLAcKsToNE's
Co mNTAmms 56 (1941). Boorstin shows that Blackstone believed the more complex and
commercial a society became, the more complicated its legal system would become in response.
Republicans seem to have reinterpreted Blackstone's message and seen in the multiplication of
laws and lawyers a cause of the increasing social complexity instead of its effect.
27. Grayson, Vice Unmasked, An Essay: Being a Consideration of the Influence of Law
Upon the Moral Essence of Man, With Other Reflections, in P. MILLER, THE LEGAL MnD IN
AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO Tim CIVIL WAR 195 (Cornell ed. 1969).
28. See Kentucky Yeoman, May 24, 1849, at 1, col. 1. See also Honestus [Benjamin
Austin], Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law (1786, 1819), reprinted in 13 AM.
J. LEGAL HiST. 244 (1969). Austin was a Boston politician who became a Jeffersonian
Republican in the 1790's. He has been described as an impetuous polemicist. See 1 DICTIONARY
AM. BIOG. 431. His essays as Honestus appeared in the Independent Chronicle in 1786, and
were republished in Boston in pamphlet form in 1819. See also Legerdemain of Law-craft, 22
DEMOCRATIC REv. 529 (1848).
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:763
Law. In one of these essays, Austin wrote: "Nothing surely can be so
detestable, as for a man to set up his principles for sale." '29 In 1830, another
critic uncharitably observed: "[Lawyers] ... are ready to execute any
prescription of either justice or injustice-to lend themselves to any side-
to advocate any doctrine .. ."30 Even some of the bar's defenders expressed
disdain for the "promiscuous advocacy" in which some lawyers engaged."
Most bar defenders, however, anchored their arguments firmly in the liberal
belief that truth was discoverable only through the clash of advocates?
2
If lack of independence generated a disdain for lawyers in the breasts
of good republicans, how could the bar respond? If there was contempt
for dependence, the profession could emphasize its professional autonomy.
It could avow that clients' control had limits, and that the profession had
public responsibilities. 3 Service of isolated individuals must be transmuted
into service to the entire community. But the bar's proclaimed independence
was not economic. The lawyer's economic existence still depended upon
employment as the tool of another's selfishness. If the lawyer was free of
one master, as the bar proclaimed, his economic survival depended upon
service to many. The profession has put emphasis through the years on
preserving its own autonomy from public control, and has spoken earnestly
about preserving the autonomy of individual lawyers from control by their
private clients. Even so, the criticism has continued because the plea has
been unresponsive to the indictment. From the perspective of many laymen,
once lawyers make an occupational commitment to surrender true autonomy
in exchange for money, whether or not the advocate retains tactical control
of a particular matter is irrelevant.
Although dependence on farming as a source of virtue dwindled in the
face of the economic transformation of the United States during the
nineteenth century, lawyers did not benefit from the developing attitude
which found alternate sources of virtue and independence in productive
29. Honestus, supra note 28, at 257.
30. See Grayson, supra note 27. This charge was of great enough concern to Sharswood,
an early formulator of legal ethics, to be addressed in his famous ethics proposals. G.
SHARswoOD, supra note 25.
31. DeBow, Law and Lawyers, in 19 DEBow's REv. 507, 508 (1855). The analogy to
prostitution is a recurrent theme in much of the literature which is critical of lawyers. See
also P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 187 (1965). For a modern discussion of these issues and their implications, see Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29.
32. See Jackson, Law and Lawyers. Is the Profession of the Advocate Consistent With
Perfect Integrity?, in P. MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE
CIVIL WAR 274, 278 (Cornell ed. 1969). See also J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 98-101 (Penguin
Classics ed. 1985).
33. See Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1988) (for a recent
discussion of the social importance of bar independence). His interpretation of the republican
view of lawyers is quite different from my own. Id. at 9-19. See also R. FERGUSON, LAW AND
LETTERs IN AMERICAN Cl.TuRnE 11-33 (1984). Ferguson argues that lawyers were the spokesmen
of republicanism in the early republic. It seems unlikely that the republicans Pocock described
would have agreed.
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work. 4 Few laymen viewed what lawyers did as productive work. Lawyers
produced nothing. They built nothing. Instead, lawyers lived off the work
of others, grinding producing men down, harassing real producers, and
thereby reducing the productive capacities of others.3 5 Thus, critics could
argue that lawyers resisted and undermined the new sources of virtue in the
same destructive manner as the bar had the old sources.
The seeming acceptance by lawyers of an apparent philosophy of pure
selfishness was disquieting enough. Republican discomfort, however, in-
creased to the level of pain as lawyers were perceived to have aligned
themselves with commercial, modernizing interests. 36 From the communitar-
ian perspective, active support for these interests did more than cast the
weight of the bar against republicanism. Such support also put lawyers in
the front rank of those actively engaged in the destruction of republican
virtue and the agrarian world capable of sustaining virtue. 7 This perspective
would explain why many of the most intense expressions of anti-lawyer
sentiment have been published during periods of rapid modernization and
fundamental change, when pressure to review basic principles and to choose
among them was most intense. One would also expect anti-lawyer sentiment
to be more pronounced among those who favored the simpler social organ-
ization of the pre-commercial agrarian community, and historically this
seems to. have been true.
38
4. Rediscovering Liberalism: The Virtues of Individualism and
Autonomy
Liberalism, the other current in American thought, has an older schol-
arly pedigree in America than republicanism, but the work of Joyce Appleby,
Isaac Kramnick, John Diggins, and others has reinvigorated liberalism in
recent years. Liberalism emphasized individualism and promised freedom
from arbitrary authority in philosophy, religion, politics, and the economy.
As formulated by John Locke and Adam Smith, liberalism encouraged the
34. See Kramnick, supra note 13, at 18. See also E. FoNER, FREE Soi, F'EE LAEOR,
FREE MEN (1970).
35. See Roeber, supra note 24, at 251. See Crevecoeur's famous comment in this regard:
[Lawyers] are plants that will grow in any soil that is cultivated by the hands of
others; and when once they have taken root they will extinguish every other vegetable
that grows around them .... The most ignorant, . . . bungling member of that
profession, will, if placed in the most obscure part of the country, promote
litigiousness, and amass more wealth without labour, than the most opulent farmer,
with all his toils.
J. CREvECoEuR, supra note 17, at 135. This was a particularly powerful image for subsequent
agrarians who suffered recurring cycles of boom and bust, which led lawyers to put almost
constant pressure on debtors in behalf of creditors.
36. See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 2, at 140-59; R. Newmyer, Daniel Webster As Toc-
queville's Lawyer: The Dartmouth College Case, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 127 (1967).
37. A. ROEBER, supra note 24, at 231-257.
38. See J. AuERBACH, supra note 6.
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rights of individuals against a compulsive, interfering state.39 Liberalism
emphasized reason and man's power to discern patterns of rationality in
nature and in society, rationalized and encouraged the pursuit of self-
interest, especially in the economic sphere, and argued that the great locus
of productive human activity was the economy, not the public life of the
polis. Contrary to republican assumptions, self-actualization would be found
in economic activity, not in participation in civic affairs.4° In short, liberalism
offered a reassuring moral and philosophical base for a modernizing,
commercial, entrepreneurial, and pluralistic America.4' Liberalism also of-
fered a clear intellectual rationale for the adversary system and those
attributes of the legal profession that were distasteful to republicans.
In an attempt to identify the point at which American society shifted
from a republican to a liberal world view, some historians in the last few
years have debated which of these two paradigms, republicanism or liber-
alism, best describes the ideology of the 1790's. Other historians have traced
elements of republicanism well into the nineteenth century. For the purposes
of this essay, whether liberalism became preponderant before or after 1800
is of little importance. The fact that evidence exists to support the persistence
of some republican ideas as cultural influences at least until the end of the
nineteenth century and that liberalism has been predominant at least since
early in that century is what is important here.42 Although the liberal
ideology has waxed stronger and stronger in the last two hundred years of
American history, the communitarian republican values survived, providing
a sometimes loud and sometimes soft counterpoint to the main liberal theme
of a modernizing, aggressively individualistic and pluralistic America, and
these communitarian values have colored American attitudes toward the
legal profession.
5. Lawyers As Champions of Liberalism
If republican attitudes toward lawyers explain some of the persistent
hostility to the profession, especially in the early republic, the contribution
of liberalism to popular perceptions of the bar was even more important.
Liberalism's attitude toward law and liberals' ambivalence about lawyers
offer a clearer explanation for the complexity of the bar's position in
America.
Lawyers were clearly perceived as aligned with the liberal side of the
debate between liberalism and republicanism. This perceived alignment
39. See D. McCoy, supra note 15, at 13-48; J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEw SOCIAL.
ORDER, supra note 10, at 93-97.
40. For a discussion of these "new" nineteenth century values, see J. HURST, LAW AND
THE CONDITIONs OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 3-32 (1964).
41. See Adams, Republicanism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY
1131 (J. Greene ed. 1984); Ross, supra note 14; Smith, supra note 10.
42. See Kloppenberg, supra note 11; Kramnick, supra note 13; Forum: The Creation of
the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and Reviews, 44 WM. & MARY Q.
549 (1987) (for a sense of the range of possible issues still in dispute).
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generated anti-lawyer sentiment among those who entertained a more com-
munitarian perspective and among those who were more antagonistic toward
individualist values than the bar has been.
While professing some communitarian values, lawyers and the adversary
system lawyers served were and remain closely associated with extreme
individualism. 43 The adversary model functions in a world inhabited by
selfish, aggressive, and isolated individuals in pursuit of private ends within
a framework of law and litigation that emphasizes conflict and competition
and denies the existence of virtue.44 The adversary system focuses disputes,
and if played out to the end, the system produces a winner and a loser.
The adversary system heightens existing conflict and encourages parties to
define their own interests in opposition to the interests of others. In other
words, the adversary system encourages clients to act selfishly.4 At the
same time, the system disconnects the dispute from the parties by trans-
forming the conflict from a personal battle between individuals into a more
abstract debate over the application of legal principles. Consider how much
more important the dampening of conflict must be to a liberal world
inhabited by aggressive individuals than to a republican community that
emphasized obligations rather than rights, and harmony rather than conflict.
This transformation of conflict into abstract legal debate forms the
basis for the profession's primary claim to usefulness. Here, a lawyer's
service to individuals can become public service. By ritualizing disputes
lawyers put limits on private conflicts thereby serving the community. 6 At
this level of abstraction, most laymen might concede the bar's usefulness.
At the pedestrian level at which people lived day by day, however, lawyers
practicing their profession were perceived to serve individual clients exclu-
sively. Lawyers served the fragments, not the whole. To make matters
worse, the fragments lawyers served constantly pushed and pulled. Lawyers
fought each other and produced heat and noise which disturbed the peace
(a mental state) and quiet of others. Perceiving service to communitarian
values in such a storm took breadth of vision.4 7
43. Neither lawyers nor the ethical codes which embody the formal standards of the
profession discount the public interest. Indeed, much of the literature of the bar consists of
accounts of the public contributions of lawyers to American society. Reading about lawyers
acting as lawyers rather than as talented citizens, however, reveals that lawyers believe they
serve the public interest best by serving their private clients. Indeed, one of the most interesting
ethical problems with which the modem bar wrestles is how to define the correct relationship
with clients who are not individuals-i.e., corporations, government agencies, and class action
clients, among others.
44. See Grayson, supra note 27, at 193.
45. See Honestus, supra note 28, at 284-285. See also Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Profes-
sionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Human Rights 1, 13 (1975).
46. See Honestus, supra note 28, at 196-197.
47. See G. SaimtswooD, supra note 25. Sharswood argued that lawyers should not judge
the justice or injustice of a client's cause despite popular criticism. The lawyers' duty was
"[e]ntire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defence of
his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability ... ." Id. at 23-24. Lawyers
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Of course, the popular identification of lawyers with liberal values also
helps explain the powerful position of the bar in America. As prominent
defenders and justifiers of private rights against public power, the bar was
a partner in the liberal struggle for individual autonomy, economic liberty,
and limited government. This aspect of the profession's relationship to
liberalism predominated in the nineteenth century, and formed a connection
to mainline nineteenth century thought that was a great source of power
for the profession both before and after the Civil War. Ironically, the bar's
success on behalf of what political economists would later label economic
laissez-faire contributed to the cultural reevaluation which transformed
liberalism at the end of the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth
century. But even before the end of the nineteenth century, changes in
American society were creating pressures which resulted in the great expan-
sion of law and a dramatic increase in its relative intrusiveness in people's
lives. With this expansion and intrusion the power of lawyers grew apace
and became more visible to average people.
Perhaps even more important to an understanding of later criticism of
lawyers by their ideological allies was the manner in which legal consider-
ations began to impinge on the perceived liberty of active individuals forcing
these individuals to involve lawyers in their decisions. 48 This development is
apparent when one considers the changes in the way lawyers practiced their
profession in 1860 compared to 1820. By 1860 the profession had begun to
specialize in the big cities and the business law firm had started to develop.
Lawyers were becoming counsellors as well as litigators, and their business
clients were forced to seek their assistance whether the clients liked it or
not. Lawyers were masters of the law. Clients became increasingly aware
that this professional power over the law gave the bar power over them as
well.
6. The Lawyer's Betrayal of Liberalism
a. The Importance of Autonomy
Liberalism, like republicanism, found in autonomy a central ideal,
although for reasons very different from those of republicanism. Liberalism
must act in this way because cases must be decided "upon the evidence, and upon the principles
of law applicable to the facts," not upon their own ex parte opinions of right and wrong. Id.
at 24-25. Elsewhere in his lecture, however, Sharswood displays some ambivalence about this
point. A more complete explanation of the role of lawyers in the adversary system as partisans
of individuals is contained in Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958).
48. Lawrence Friedman has described this expansion of the reach of law in the nineteenth
century: "One basic, critical fact of 19th-century law was that the official legal system
penetrated, and had to penetrate, deeper and deeper into society." L. FREEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 113 (2d ed. 1985). See also A. ROEBER, supra note 24. "One can hardly
argue with the Country feeling that, in the long run, the rise of lawyers and courts spells the
end of the independent man's abilities to handle his own affairs responsibly." Id. at 258.
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was liberating. 49 The belief that progress would accelerate if the individual
could be freed from the compulsive control of the state was at the heart
of liberalism. The freedom to choose was central both for John Locke and
Adam Smith, the two most important proponents of liberal political thought
and liberal economics. Both Locke and Smith believed that the sum total
of individual choices would describe a rational (both reasonable and rea-
soned) structure free from the magnified distortions that result from the
arbitrary action of government. 50 Pursuing private ends free from external
interference, therefore, was not only efficient for individuals but natural
and moral as well. 5' This promise of freedom and the rational ordering of
society produced the sum of self-interested choices that formed the heart
of liberalism's appeal.12 Without individual autonomy and the liberating
power of choice, the central promise of liberalism was illusory.
3
If lawyers were perceived as undermining autonomy and individual
choice, they would appear to betray liberalism at its foundation. Hints at
such a perception appear in some anti-lawyer literature. In particular,
outbursts against lawyer-imposed legal complexity expressed this idea. Legal
complexity made choices more difficult and made the exercise of true
independence impossible. In addition, legal complexity forced dependence
on experts, and when this dependence became apparent, masters experienced
49. See John Stuart Mill's famous essay, On Liberty, for an eloquent statement of this
aspect of nineteenth century liberalism. See also J. HURST, supra note 40, at 8-11.
50. In economics this magic would be wrought by Smith's "invisible hand" and in
Locke's politics by man's reasoned understanding of natural law. In defining liberalism Dorothy
Ross has written:
The new ethic drew on the Enlightenment view that modem civilization was moving
toward increasing wealth and diversification, and that these conditions promised
fuller development of the individual's rich and diverse potentialities. Natural prin-
ciples of economic organization came to be seen as the central factor in progress
and economic activity as the foundation of morality. Disciplined by the necessities
of the market, self-interest would generate industry and frugality, individual auton-
omy and mutual trust.
Ross, supra note 14, at 753.
51. See L. WEINRmm, NATIUL LAW AND JusTicE 76-83 (1987).
52. See J.S. MiLL, supra note 32. In his classic work Mill makes the nineteenth century
liberal case for liberty. His defense of the pursuit of truth through the clash of opposing ideas
strongly resembles theories justifying the adversary system. See id. at 75-118.
53. The ideal in Mill's liberalism was as dependent on individual autonomy as republi-
canism and was equally tied to property. Mill's concern went beyond the restrictions on
autonomy imposed by government. He was equally concerned about the coercive power of
public opinion.
In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them
independent of the good will of other people, opinion ... is as efficacious as law;
men might as well be imprisoned as excluded from the means of earning their bread.
Those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favours from men in
power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the
open avowal of any opinions but to be ill-thought of and ill-spoken of, and this it
ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear.
J.S. MILL, supra note 32, at 93.
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the constraints of servitude, and legal counsellors suffered the hostility
reserved for upstarts.
5 4
b. Lawyer-Imposed Complexity and the Destruction of Autonomy
Critics of the bar have often berated lawyers for making simple things
complicated. Specifically, critics charge that lawyers insinuate themselves
into every transaction and bend everything to conform to a legal framework
that the bar has devised.15 This legal framework is characterized by its
foreign language, its encrypted landmarks, and its strange and artificial
approach to problems.
Many of the most acerbic attacks on the legal profession can be classified
as expressions of the rage of disempowered laymen. One frustrated nine-
teenth century critic of the bar summarized such a charge in an anonymous
essay:
The role of lawyers] appears to be to distort plain common sense
and truth into all the tortuous twists and sinuosities of which a
lawyer's logic is susceptible .... With their canine Latin and the
perpetual wrangling of opposing counsel, as well as their pertina-
cious perversity for torturing simple facts-what was originally clear
and intelligible, at length becomes such mystification, that to one
not initiated into the sophisms and subtleties of legal disquisition,
it appears impossible to distinguish between wrong and right.
5 6
Even reason itself, and its sibling untutored common sense, became
unreliable in the strange universe of the lawyer. Lay judges could be driven
to extremes by their determination not to surrender their autonomy of
decision to artificial learning of dubious value. For example, Judge John
Dudley, a lay judge of the New Hampshire trial court, asserted his own
independence and confirmed that of the jury when he charged in a case:
"A clear head and an honest heart are wuth [sic] more than all the law of
the lawyers .... It's our business to do justice between the parties; not by
any quirks o' the law out of Coke or Blackstone-books that I never read
and never will-but by common sense and common honesty between man
and man."51 7 It would be difficult to find another statement which better
54. See Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at 15-18.
55. See Honestus, supra note 28; The Abuses of the Law Courts, 21 DEMOCRATIC REV.
305 (1847).
56. Legerdemain of Law-Craft, supra note 28, at 530, 534. Honestus lodged a similar
complaint when he described some lawyers as "men [who are] endeavoring to perplex and
embarrass every judicial proceeding; who are rendering intricate even the most simple principles
of law; who are practising the greatest art in order to delay every process .... Honestus,
supra note 28, at 249-250.
57. This passage is taken from a jury charge dating from the first decade of the
nineteenth century. The charge is excerpted in J. ZAINALDiN, LAW N ANTEBELLum SocErY:
LEGAL CHANGE AND ECONOMc EXPANsION 83 (1983). It also appears in somewhat altered form
in D. BooRST, THE AmEiCANs: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENcE 201 (1958).
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exemplifies resistance to substituting "lawyer's sense" for common sense
and thereby losing the right and ability to make decisions without profes-
sional assistance.
5 8
Another mid-nineteenth century essayisf addressed the negative popular
effect of the lawyer's attack on autonomy directly. He argued that hostility
to lawyers arose in part from the profession's intrusiveness. The practice
of law "vitally affects, and authoritatively determines the most sensitive
interests of society, regulating every man's conduct and interfering in every
man's business." 59 Lawyer professionalism with its demand for expertise,
its jargon, and its arcane learning, conspired to drain power from the lay
person and invest power in the lawyer. 60 What adult, even today, would
not be angered by this reallocation of power? Imagine the effect upon
enterprising nineteenth century Americans, bred to an aggressive individu-
alism and an ethic which encouraged the almost unbounded, headlong
pursuit of wealth and power.
III. A LEGAL ARISTOCRACY?
A. Lawyers and the Misappropriation of the Law
The increasing complexity of the law generated another complaint. To
those who believed that the profession's growing sophistication, 6' profes-
sionalization, and claim that law was a science represented nothing more
than a false and self-serving grab for power, these complexities confirmed
earlier suspicions. The appropriation of the law by lawyers fit with other
nineteenth century developments and seemed one more example of the
conspiracy of the learned against everyone else. The appropriation of law
by lawyers, however, was especially pernicious. In a democratic republic
which was forced more and more to look to law for limiting principles, the
law must be comprehensible. In others words, the law must be accessible
to simple understanding. 62 The codification movement in the early nineteenth
century was an articulate manifestation of this belief in accessibility. 6 The
drive to mandate the use of "plain English" in legal documents in recent
years is a modern example of the same attitude.
58. See P. MILLER, supra note 31, at 99-104.
59. Kettell, The American Bar, 28 DEMOCRATIC REv. 195, 198 (1851). See also P. MILLER,
supra note 31, at 102.
60. See Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of the Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1988) (for a discussion of the problem of
control in the attorney-client relationship).
61. Sophistication is a wonderfully expressive word. Is it the end product of the efforts
of sophists?
62. Honestus, supra note 28, at 253, 263.
63. See Field, Reform in the Legal Profession and the Laws (Mar. 23, 1855), in P.
MILER, THE LEGAL MiND rN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CrCv WAR 290 (Cornell
ed. 1969).
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On the other hand, for those who accepted these changes as progress,
these developments would offer a justification for the elevation of lawyers
as professionals above the common mass. These changes increased the
profession's already substantial prestige.
Certainly, some anti-lawyer sentiment rested upon popular discontent
over the perceived appropriation of law by lawyers. This appropriation
undermined both the republican and the liberal ideals of individual auton-
omy, and betrayed the hope of both that the law could be comprehensible
to all-that the law could and should belong to the entire community. The
combination of complexity and jargon denied laymen the right to understand
for themselves the rules by which they must live. Some attacks on the
profession or on the common law were actually arguments against the
artificiality which discredited both. Honestus wrote with great clarity upon
this point. 64
Less well-known critics expressed much the same idea. One particularly
incensed mid-nineteenth century critic of the legal profession used more
inflammatory rhetoric when he wrote:
The disempowerment of nonlawyers] . .. results from the operation
of the technicalities of the laws, and the arbitrary rules, forms,
fictions and falsehoods of the laws; ... invented by lawyers, and
introduced into the laws and the administration of justice by lawyers
and Judges, to obscure the laws for the benefit of lawyers; to
prevent the people from understanding the legal methods of pros-
ecuting and defending their rights; to make the laws a source of
endless confusion, vice, and litigation among the people; to involve
the rights of the people in all the mazes of legal and technical
jargon, for the benefit of lawyers; to enable lawyers and others to
fleece the people with impunity .... 65
Lawyers could be viewed as sapping client autonomy at the structural
level by creating and manipulating a pervasive legal framework that re-
strained and constrained social, legal, and economic decisionmaking. Law-
yers also appeared to dilute and to destroy client autonomy in the interpersonal
relations between individual lawyers and their individual clients.
64. See Honestus, supra note 28, at 257-258. See also Sampson, An Anniversary Discourse
... Showing the Origin, Progress, Antiquities, Curiosities, and Nature of the Common Law
(Dec. 6, 1823), in P. MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN Am ERCA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE
CrvIL WAR 131-132 (Cornell 1969).
65. This quotation from something referred to as The Political Guide is drawn from a
lengthy attack on the legal profession which covered four columns on the front page of the
Kentucky Yeoman, one of the leading Democratic newspapers in Kentucky at the time (1849).
The article closes with the following interesting couplet:
" 'To rouse up the slumbering virtues of the land,
And against corruption make one glorious stand?'
There can be no doubt that this is a cry for a return to republican values, even if the author
had not planted a red flag by signing his article "Jefferson." Kentucky Yeoman, May 24,
1849, at 1, col. 2. See also Wells, Law Reform, 21 DaMocRAric REv. 1 (1847).
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Professionalism-training, jargon, and separate status-opened and
maintained a gulf between the client and the lawyer. The client was forced
to put himself completely in the hands of the lawyer, and the client had
no reliable way of evaluating the quality of the services he received. The
client's expertise in other fields, mature judgment, and common sense
offered unreliable guidance once he moved into the lawyers' world.
At least at one level, this kind of attack on lawyers articulates the angry
complaint of any autonomous adult forced into the role of dependent child.
Even when the lawyer performed his function in the manner later com-
manded by the ethical codes, leaving decisions as to the goals of represen-
tation-the ultimate decisions-to the client, all of the client's choices were
constrained and shaped by the advice the lawyer offered and by the
information about the legal context of alternatives the lawyer gave.6
Dependence and loss of control frustrate and irritate. Liberal Americans
felt these emotions acutely precisely because dependence on lawyers forced
these individuals to surrender much of the individual autonomy that they
had struggled to obtain and that our legal system had, in theory, developed
to preserve. The fact that those persons most likely to have direct profes-
sional contact with lawyers were people of substance further exacerbated
these feelings. Persons of substance were the persons involved in economic
activity. These individuals had confidence in their own capacities. Such
persons would feel more acutely than others a lawyer-imposed sense of
incapacity.
B. A Society Run by Lawyers
1. The "Toils" of the Law
Ironically, lawyers, who championed the liberal cause thereby alienating
communitarians, immediately set about constructing what must have ap-
peared to libertarians as a progressively more and more complicated web
of law. While espousing individual freedom in the abstract, lawyers left
individuals progressively less room for the independent exercise of choice.
Once freed from traditional regulators of conduct-familial, religious, and
communal institutions-the remaining framework of restraint-the law-
had to expand and assume many of the tasks formerly assigned to other
loci of control. Law became, therefore, noticeably more chafing. Conse-
quently, lawyers, the architects and engineers of law, became progressively
more annoying. Particularly in the twentieth century, modern lay-Gullivers
have become enmeshed in the toils spun and secured by lawyer-Lilliputions-
legislators, regulators, administrators, judges, and public and private ad-
66. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILIY EC 7-7, 7-8 (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1987). See also Strauss, supra note 60.
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vocates. Consequently, people ensnared have struggled and bellowed with
anger against the people holding the ropes-the lawyers.67
Nineteenth century Americans became law focused, in part because
there was so little else to hold them together.6 8 The triumph of liberalism
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries liberated powerful
centrifugal forces which worked to detach individuals from traditional
regulators of conduct and to encourage isolated, predatory behavior. These
changes increased American dependence on the centripetal power of law,
and the apotheosis of law entailed the elevation of lawyers, the law's "high
priests." 69 Imagining the liberal triumph without the correlative triumph of
the legal profession is nearly impossible. There is an inevitability to this
equation. The displacement of other constraining institutions by law, the
victory of the liberal ideal of the rule of law, and the accompanying
displacement of old elites, all worked so much in favor of the bar that
many articulate Americans came to believe that lawyers had somehow
anticipated the effects of such changes and conspired to achieve them.
Therefore, in the lawyer and liberal moment of victory in the liberal struggle
against other sources of authority allies became enemies.
The liberal pursuit of freedom came to appear less a struggle to destroy
arbitrary external authority than a struggle to run lawyers to the top of the
social heap. Consequently, lawyers could be indicted for a conspiratorial
betrayal of their social allies and for the grossest kind of self-serving
hypocrisy. Lawyers could be charged with preaching Locke to others while
secretly acting upon Hobbesian principles themselves. Those who might have
acquiesced quietly in the growth of the legal brier patch would not accept
passively the apparent self-promotion of the bar. The rule of law was
supposed to promote egalitarianism.7 0 Nonlawyers never intended the rule
of law to result in the permanent gentrification of the legal profession. The
constitution of a legal aristocracy, to borrow Tocqueville's famous image,
was galling for the old aristocrats. It was even more distasteful for those
who had assumed that they, not their lawyers, would become the new
aristocrats. Neither the old gentry nor the new hopefuls could suffer the
elevation of the profession in silence.
2. Political Domination
Resentment of the lawyer-imposed loss of autonomy in matters of
private law spilled over into criticism of the public role of the bar. The
67. Thinking about law in this way is so widespread that Webster's Unabridged Diction-
ary, after defining "toil" as "something by which one is held fast, entangled, or involved in
seemingly inexiricable difficulties" offers "in the toils of the law" as an example of common
usage. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA-
BRIDGED 2404 (1971).
68. See Stevens, The Nature of a Learned Profession, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 577 (1984).
69. Daniel Boorstin refers to post-Civil War lawyers as "high priests." D. BOoRsTIN,
THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOcRAIC EXPERIENCE 416 (1973). Gerard Gawalt also used this image
in the title of a collection of essays about lawyers. THE NEw HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST
Crvrl WAR AMERICA (G. Gawalt ed. 1984).
70. See J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 10.
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special status of the bar was driven home unambiguously by the profession's
high political profile. Because law came to provide the fundamental structure
of our liberal society, lawyers occupied a privileged position in our public
life.7'
Lawyers' domination of politics goes back to the origins of history in
America. Lawyers were prominent during the imperial crisis and as revo-
lutionaries making a revolution in the defense of law, both English and
natural.7 2 Lawyers were prominent among the Founders, enshrining the
special status of law in the American Constitution. Lawyers have been
grossly overrepresented in American political life ever since. 73 The bar has
pointed periodically to these facts with pride while the bar's critics period-
ically have accused lawyers of usurping the political birthright of their fellow
countrymen.7 4
For republican-minded opponents of the profession, the role of lawyers
in American politics was destructive in four ways. First, because lawyers
lacked virtue, lawyers would champion the commercial cosmopolitan posi-
tion in public debate, consequently destroying the social and economic
foundations upon which republican virtue rested. Second, by engrossing
offices and public duties, lawyers prevented laymen from fulfilling them-
selves by means of full political participation. By displacing ordinary citizens
from political life, lawyers denied laymen their republican birthright. 75 Third,
71. The legal profession, by a very natural tendency, absorbs all political office
and emolument. The habit of public discussion and the transaction of public business,
give to the professional jurist a facility and confidence, which too many good-
natured folks regard as the highest qualifications for confidential trusts; and he
stands out the most prominent man for whatever lucrative or honorable station may
be thought worthy of his talents. His boldness prompts him to pretension, while the
modesty of the private citizen opposes no obstacle to his ambition, and he soon
finds himself installed in a place, which, had virtue and true merit alone been
consulted, might have been possessed by some less assuming aspirant.
The Abuses of the Law Courts, supra note 55, at 309. The author of this piece goes on to
argue that the influence of lawyers in the legislatures and the "public counsels of the nation,"
will "tickle the ear or challenge the admiration of some young Pericles ... at the expense of
sound sense and judgrnnt, ... engender[ing] a false taste for the light and frivolous, and
disparag[ing] the simple Roman manners of a republican people." Id. at 309-310. See also
Stevens, supra note 68. One of the central themes of Justice Without Law? is the substitution
of law for community and for the other elements which "glue" a society together. See J.
AUERBACH, supra note 6.
72. See F. McDoNALD, supra note 18.
73. J. HURST, supra note 1, at 352-56 (1950); R. WOOSTER, PoLrTcs, PLANTERS AND
PLAIN FOLK: COURTHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE IN THE UPPER SOUTH, 1850-1860 (1975); Metcalf,
The Profession in the Political History of the United States, 16 YALE L.J. 182, 183 (1907).
74. See Pound, The Lay Tradition As To the Lawyer, 12 MicH. L. REv. 627, 629 (1914).
A shrill example of the latter is the letter signed "Jefferson" which appeared in the Kentucky
Yeoman on May 24, 1849. See Kentucky Yeoman, supra note 65.
75. "[The almost inevitable promotion that follows in the wake of the legal profession,
is calculated to paralyze the energies of the non-professional classes, and prevent that acquain-
tance with political science, which would result from a different system .... " The Abuse of
the Law Courts, supra note 55, at 310. See also "Jefferson" in the Kentucky Yeoman, supra
note 65.
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lawyers participated in politics for the wrong reasons. Lawyers sought public
office for selfish, self-promotional reasons, sought the spotlight in order to
display their skills and to attract clients, and sought power in order to
maintain the complexity of the law in order to assure that law would
continue to be a mystery in the sole possession of lawyers. Thus, lawyers
as politicians guaranteed confusion, contention, and litigation, and the
continued production of grist for the lawyer's professional mill.7 6 Fourth,
lawyers were less worthy of public trust than laymen because the legal
occupation made lawyers dependent and practiced liars.
77
Lawyer political dominance was also problematic for liberals. One
important goal of liberalism was to assure social equality to individuals.
This goal was to be achieved by destroying distorting privileges and by
enshrining the rule of law. By elevating law above all other institutions,
however, liberalism also elevated lawyers above their fellow citizens. 78 Even
worse, if elevation of the bar was the result of the crafty selfishness of the
profession, how could lawyers be expected to use the power they had
thereby gained? The clear answer to many could only have been selfishly.
Critics could reasonably fear the worst from political lawyers. The lessons
of history where lawyers were concerned must be understood in the light
of the working assumptions of nineteenth century liberalism. Individuals
acted selfishly for calculated gain. The pursuit of self-interest in the eco-
nomic sphere was good because activites grounded on self-interest would
produce the greatest good for the greatest number. Such behavior would
create wealth by increasing productivity and raising the standard of living
for all.
Politics, however, was another matter. Early nineteenth century Amer-
icans' republican political roots told them that the pursuit of self-interest
in public life would lead by one road or another to tyranny. Disinterestedness
was best in the political realm, and both republicanism and liberal experience
taught that lawyers were the least disinterested of men. When these as-
sumptions about lawyers' bad motives in public life were added to the bar's
ability to understand and manipulate laws in ways nonlawyers could not
comprehend, the perceived potential for abuse was staggering. The geometric
increase in the complexity of nineteenth century society and the growing
number of laws which regulated that society made lawyers as indispensable
76. See "Jefferson" in Kentucky Yeoman, supra note 65. This idea is a central issue
for Honestus. He wrote: "Is it not contrary to every principle of propriety to admit men to
make laws, who are living upon the practice of them? They surely will ever find it for their
interest to make them so indefinite in their construction, as to allow of many plausible
objections against them in their future practice." Honestus, supra note 28, at 254.
77. Nor would we wish to make an invidious distinction, in moral point of view,
between the two classes [lawyers and nonlawyers] of our citizens; yet it is but justice
to remark, that the influence which long and confirmed habits of prevarication and
artifice naturally exert upon the mind, renders the professional lawyer less worthy
of public confidence than the plain and uncontaminated private citizen.
The Abuses of the Law Courts, supra note 55, at 309.
78. See Honestus, supra note 28, at 270-271.
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in political life as in private life. But, republican political assumptions made
lawyers appear to the public thoroughly untrustworthy. The public's great
fear was that lawyers' political supremacy would permit the bar's selfishness
full and disastrous play.
C. Tocqueville's Lawyers and Jacksonian America
1. Elitism and the Protection of Private Rights
Alexis de Tocqueville's famous description of the legal profession in
America confirmed another popular suspicion about the bar. In his famous
discussion of American society, Democracy in America, Tocqueville de-
scribed the bar as aristocratic, conservative, and anti-democratic in its
opinions.7 9 He characterized the bar's political role in terms which have
rankled democrats ever since, and encouraged Americans to see lawyers as
a unitary interest rather than a collection of diverse individuals. Tocqueville
wrote:
When the American people is intoxicated by passion, or carried
away by impetuosity of its ideas, it is checked and stopped by the
almost invisible influence of its legal counsellors, who secretly
oppose their aristocratic propensities to its democratic instincts,
their superstitious attachment to what is antique to its love of
novelty, their narrow views to its immense designs, and their habitual
procrastination to its ardent impatience.80
This characterization was clearly double-edged when loosed in Jackso-
nian America. If Tocqueville was correct in his understanding of the bar
as a new aristocracy, then lawyers were guilty of an anti-egalitarian heresy
and lawyers would have to be brought down. Lawyers would be a permanent
structural irritant, a denial of democratic values to be encountered constantly
in politics and ripe for democratic attack. On the other hand, men of
property had always recognized the potential for excess inherent in popular
government. If the bar itself could be reconstituted along democratic lines,
the functions Tocqueville assigned to it might prove useful.
Tocqueville's intent was not to fuel hostility to the bar. Indeed, Toc-
queville clearly believed that the attributes he associated with lawyers were
beneficial to American society. Tocqueville not only sought to describe
American democracy, but also to find elements unique to American society
that would permit the freedom which the new country promised to survive.
He found one such element in the legal profession.
Tocqueville saw in the majority will the threat of a tyranny both familiar
and yet entirely new. The threat was familiar because it portended to
produce a debilitating compulsion to uniformity. It was new because its
79. A. TOCQUEVI.LE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AmERICA 272-80 (H. Reeve trans. ed. 1945).
80. Id. at 278.
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authority would be far more pervasive and compelling than anything ex-
perienced by Europe before the advent of modern totalitarianism. In Toc-
queville's view, the excesses of democracy he found in America needed
restraint if democracy was to survive in substance as well as in form. The
legal profession he described was one institution which could serve "to
neutralize the vices inherent in popular government."'" One should not
overlook this positive implication of Tocqueville's critique. He asked a
familiar question: How could America avoid a tyranny of the majority?
How could a society committed to popular sovereignty and majority rule
protect minority rights?
In his classic, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith named the protection
of property as one of the three functions that government would retain in
the post-mercantilist, liberal world for which he pled. The same problem-
the means for the protection of a propertied minority against majority
injustice-had been faced by Americans before Tocqueville, and continued
to be discussed after him. This problem was certainly a fundamental theme
in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and has remained a fundamental
problem ever since, though recast in the twentieth century in terms of the
protection of rights other than property.
2. The Consolidation of Bar Power
a. Jacksonian Egalitarianism
The problem Tocqueville articulated and the place that he assigned the
legal profession in its solution proved, on balance, a source of strength to
the bar. The reconciliation of majority rule with minority rights, especially
property rights, had troubled the Founders. The Founders had looked also
to the legal profession-as practitioners and as judges-for a solution, and
the profession had accepted the burden. 82 If lawyers could fulfill this
function, they would be worth the price they would exact in exchange. If
serving in this role could make the lawyer a hero in the abstract, however,
it also assured that the majority would always find him an obstructing
villain in any particular case.
81. Id.
82. It would be difficult to argue that the Founders at Philadelphia had not assumed
the existence of judicial review-assigning, at least in part, the defense of minorities to the
courts. See M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 73-83, 298-299, 375-376, 390-391, 440; THE
FEDERALiST Nos. 78-81, at 464-491 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). There can be no
doubt that nineteenth century lawyers embraced this role.
The advocate not infrequently finds himself ... putting at hazard the popularity of
a life devoted to the public service .... It is then, that the shouts of the multitude
drown the still, small voice of the unsheltered sufferer. It is then, that the victim
bound for immolation; and the advocate stands alone, to maintain the supremacy
of the law against power, and numbers, and public applause, and private wealth.
Story, Discourse Pronounced Upon the Inauguration of the Author, in MILLER, THE LEGAL
MIND N AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIvIL WAR 181.
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The Jacksonians of the 1830's were less willing than the Founders to
permit an elite bar to enjoy such power. If the common man would not
readily tolerate an elitist profession, however, he might abide an open
profession which served so useful a purpose as to restrain public passions
and protect property. For the Jacksonians, as for the Founders, the bar's
abhorrence of "arbitrary power" 3 was serviceable for public ends.
Significantly, the Jacksonian attacks on the legal profession focused on
opening the profession to all. Even the Jacksonians did not reject the role
Tocqueville assigned to the bar.
The bar's defenders argued that the profession was open to all and
included members from divergent backgrounds. 4 Bar membership was con-
stantly changing and this fact prevented any long-term "consistency of
purpose" different from the purposes of the polity as a whole.85 Except for
relatively short periods of time in relatively few localities, the legal profession
has been open enough so that any white male could aspire to membership.1
6
This openness did not mean that all levels of the bar were open to everyone.
83. A. Toqueville, supra note 79, at 275.
84. See Minor, The Legal Profession, 13 S. & W. LrrERARY MESSENGER 356, 357-358
(1847). Benjamin Minor was the lawyer-editor of this journal. There is still debate about
whether the bar generally has been open to most Americans. Obviously, any discussion of this
question must begin with the recognition that through most of our history the test of the
democratic character of institutions was whether they were open to all white male adults, not
whether they were open to women and minorities. I am interested here not in the reality, but
with the perception of openness. If the bar was perceived as open generally to white males, it
would have been viewed by most people as democratic. See Bloomfield, Law vs. Politics: The
Self-Image of the American Bar (1830-1860) 12 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 306 (1968).
85. Minor, supra note 84, at 357-58. It is interesting that Minor did not discuss the
difference between laymen and lawyers produced by legal training and practice. He rejected
Tocqueville's suggestion that lawyers have their own anti-democratic program. He did not
deny that lawyers may proceed more slowly and deliberately in forming opinions or in acting
upon their views once developed. Minor leaves open the possibility that differences between
laymen and lawyers do exist in their attitudes toward law, individualism, self-interest, and the
complexity of the world through which they move, and this possibility requires a revision of
Tocqueville's argument, rather than its rejection. The question is not whether Tocqueville was
right about the substantive differences between laymen and lawyers which he discussed, but
rather whether the search for such differences could legitimately continue. As this essay makes
clear, I believe differences do exist but that these differences grow out of legal training and
methods of thought and are exhibited in the choice of means rather than in the choice of
ends.
After a careful study of members of the Massachusetts bar between 1790 and 1860, Gerard
Gawat concluded that lawyer politicians did not form a homogeneous group. He wrote: "For
lawyers in politics, there was no consensus beyond participation [in the period 1790 to 1860]
... [Trained lawyers were associated with every major political party or faction." Gawalt
further stated that his evidence did not support the hypothesis that lawyers belonged chiefly
to the conservative parties. Instead, he wrote: "Lawyers, like other politicians, reflected their
constituencies." G. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: Tan EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS (1740-1840) 95 (1979).
86. See G. GAWALT, Tan PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN MASSACHUSETTS (1760-1840) (1979) (for a careful discussion of the attempt to keep the early
Massachusetts bar small and "socially respectable"); L. Friedman, supra note 48, at 303-318.
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The elite bar, especially in the larger cities of the United States, has been
much less open to social outsiders than the profession as a whole, and this
pattern persists today.Y7 Certainly after the Jacksonians finished "reforming"
the legal profession by diluting admission requirements, the plea of openness
became plausible.
Roscoe Pound was mistaken when he argued that the Jacksonian attacks
on the bar in the 1820's and 1830's undermined the legal profession. Their
attacks were aimed not at the role of lawyers in American society, but at
the imagined elitism of the bar in some localities.8 8 Even as Tocqueville
wrote, this elitist bar was passing away in the few places where it had
existed and had failed to disintegrate earlier. By reforming the elitist image
of the bar, the Jacksonians greatly strengthened the profession. By recasting
the bar's image, the Jacksonians transformed the bar into the kind of
institution that democracy-minded Americans could accept and integrate
into their new society.
More important than the reality of openness, however, was the popular
perception that this profession of power, influence, and high social status
was open to all. The opportunity for upward social and economic mobility
provided by the legal profession has been a truism in American culture.
Lawyers cultivated this popular view especially during the nineteenth cen-
tury.89 To some extent, the opportunity has been real. In recent times some
critics of the legal profession have even expressed the concern that the
profession is too attractive; that law recruits too many talented people
thereby impoverishing other necessary and more productive occupations2 °
This perceived openness of the profession has strengthened the bar
because lawyers have come to symbolize, at least in this respect, the
republican ideal of equality among citizens and the liberal ideal of individ-
ualism and success based on competition and merit.
b. Lawyers and the Management of Change
Lawyers' "disinclination to innovate" served another useful purpose.
The disinclination provided continuity and some measure of stability to a
87. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976).
88. The Jacksonian attack on the legal profession was in some ways analogous to their
attack on corporations. Both targets served as symbols of special privilege and of a perceived
elitist control of fundamental institutions. However strident the rhetoric, the Jacksonians
wanted to outlaw neither corporations nor the bar. What they wanted was for incorporation
to be generally available to the "common man" and for the bar to be open to all (white adult
males).
89. See M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, 136-
90 (1976); Bloomfield, Lawyers and Public Criticism: Challenge and Response in Nineteenth-
Century America, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269 (1971). This argument runs through the popular
collective biographies of the legal profession published during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. See THE LAWYERS AND LAWMAKERS OF KENTUCKY (H. Levin ed. 1897) (for an
example of this genre).
90. See Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570
(1983).
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society otherwise renowned for rootlessness and love of change. 9' For
republicans, change was especially problematic, because, at least in politics,
republicans believed that change led to decline. Change was degeneration.
Men with republican ideals, however, also believed in progress in the arts
and in science, and advances in these fields undermined republicanism's
agrarian base and encouraged modernization. Thomas Jefferson symbolized
the dilemma republicans faced. Despite his republican principles, Jefferson
pursued the solution to whatever problems, scientific or otherwise, caught
his attention. This same attitude in others produced the science and machines
which drove the industrial transformation of America.
In the social chaos of the first half of the nineteenth century, the
Jacksonians came to recognize the critical role that law must play in holding
America together while they were busily remaking the country. As Tocque-
ville suggested, lawyers could provide continuity with the past when so
many other connections to the past were being severed.
The problem of accommodating change is fundamental in all societies,
but the problem was acute in nineteenth century America. Few societies
have undergone such profound and rapid change with so few stabilizing
institutions to ease the way.92 If the pressure of change has been more
constant in America, it has also been more diffused. Of the European
countries, only England's history since the end of the seventeenth century
has been as even-tempered as American history. Our remarkable adaptability
was the result not of our homogeneity, which disappeared in the course of
the nineteenth century, but of the primal role played by law and lawyers.
As Tocqueville noted, in America all public questions eventually become
legal ones. Private law and public policy are inseparable in America. Law
and politics are too completely enmeshed. In both realms lawyers mediate
change, and through the courts, lawyers connect law and policy.
One of the most apparent features of nineteenth century America is the
extent to which lawyers as judges or in other public and private capacities
poured new wine into old bottles, mediating change by disguising it. In
law, change rarely sprang suddenly into the open. Rather change grew
slowly in the breaking down and building up of rules. Change crept quietly
into the common law by means of that insinuating flexibility all lawyers
recognize as the common law's identifying feature. Even when something
truly new was delivered, the innovation's break with the past was rarely
acknowledged.
The additional feature of the American system, and the thing which
most accounts for the system's peaceful adaptability, is the fact that we
91. A. TOcQUEVrLLE, supra note 79, at 279.
92. Of course, the absence of "stabilizing" institutions like an aristocracy, a monarchy,
or an established religion, has been a benefit as well as a burden. Arguably, less entrenched
resistance to change has resulted from the absence of these institutions. With the exception of
the blood shed over the abolition of slavery, Americans have not progressed in the European
style of alternating periods of revolutionary convulsion with periods of reaction. With the
exception of the Civil War, Americans have adapted peacefully to change.
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have accepted the application of private law techniques to the public law
arena. The language of the Constitution and public discourse remains the
same while the meaning changes. The conventions of American public life
are evolutionary because our legal system abhors discontinuity and our
public life is made in the legal system's image. In this context, the words
that Shakespeare put into the mouth of a true revolutionary in Henry VI,
part 2, should have special meaning for true radicals in America.
So long as Americans want reassurance that they are not changing while
they undergo successive transformations, Americans will need lawyers and
the stability the Anglo-American legal method offers. This method applied
to our public as well as to our private life permits Americans to pursue
progress without risking decline.
This mediation of change also explains why the Jacksonian attack on
the bar was fleeting, and as with other anti-lawyer episodes in American
history, had no appreciable impact on the long-term status of the profes-
sion. 93 The ability to manage change has been one of the central services
provided by the profession to an America saturated with change and seeking
stability, and has proved a persistent source of strength to the profession.
By recognizing the value of legal continuity in the face of fundamental
change, and by persuading the public that a new bar created in the public
mind by Jacksonian "reforms" belonged to them, the Jacksonians strength-
ened the profession, helped the bar consolidate its power, and assured its
continuing influence in America.
IV. HUMAN NATURE AND THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT
A. "[T]o tame this fierce Creature".- The Need For External Restraint
Tocqueville's search for social mechanisms that would provide the
restraints necessary to the preservation of democracy suggests another source
of the legal profession's power. Despite occasional lapses into optimism,
Americans have generally entertained a low opinion of human nature. The
depth of this conviction is most apparent in the example of Puritan New
England in the colonial period.
The Puritan conception of man provided little basis for optimism.
Puritans believed:
[Law was necessary] to restrain ... unruly Lusts, and keep, within
due Bounds, the rampant Passions of Men, which else would soon
throw humane Society into the last Disorder and Confusion. ...
[Men] would become fiercer upon one another than Beasts of
Prey .... [D]oes not this necessitate Laws to tame this fiekce
93. It is necessary to distinguish between the role of the profession and its membership.
It would be difficult to argue that the activity of the 1820's and 1830's had no effect on
membership. What I am arguing here is that the Jacksonian attacks had little or no effect on
the profession.
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Creature, to bound his Appetites, & bridle his Passions, that he
may not be injurious to his Neighbour
4
William Penn expressed a similar concern about human nature in 1693
when he wrote:
Not that men know not what is right, their excesses, and wherein
they are to blame ... [b]ut so depraved is human nature that
without compulsion ... too many would not readily be brought to
do what they know is right ... or to avoid what they are satisfied
they should not do.95
In an otherwise optimistic account of early America, Crevecoeur penned
in 1782 a remarkably Hobbesian reflection on human nature.
We certainly are not that class of beings which we vainly think
ourselves to be; man an animal of prey, seems to have rapine and
the love of bloodshed implanted in his heart ... [Mien, like the
elements, are always at war; the weakest yield to the most potent;
force, subtlety, and malice, always triumph.... [W]e love to talk
of virtue ... but when we step forth into active life, if it happen
to be in competition with any passion or desire, do we observe it
to prevail?
96
Man needed law and lawyers because man needed restraint. For John
Locke, the restraint man needed was built into human nature by God.
Reason ruled by divine decree, and man was expected to bend to reason's
authority.9 7 But Locke's view of human nature did not emerge triumphant
from the Revolution; Hobbes' view did. Even in the Age of Reason, reason
did not hold unchallenged sway. John Adams wrote that: "Human Reason
and human conscience though I believe there are such things, are not a
match, for human passions, human Imaginations, and human Enthusi-
asm." 98 Benjamin Franklin, known for his occasional cynicism as well as
for his wit, wrote in the same vein in his autobiography: "So convenient a
thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make
a reason for everything one has a mind to do."'
By the late seventeenth century, early colonial notions of community
were in decline even in New England, and the attempt to reassert a utopian
94. John Barnard, The Throne Established by Righteousness (1734), in THE PURiTANs:
A SOURCEBOOK OF THEm WarmrNGs 270, 272 (P. Miller and T. Johnson ed. 1938).
95. M. CURTi, HUMAN NATURE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: A HISTORY 39 (1980) (quoting
William Penn on human nature).
96. J. CRE EcoEUR, supra note 17, at 162-163.
97. In his Two Treatises on Government, Locke wrote: "The state of nature has a law
of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law teaches all
mankind who will but consult it .. " J. LocKE, Two TREATIsEs OF GOVERNMENT, II § 6 at
311 (P. Laslett, Mentor rev. ed. 1965).
98. M. CuRTi, supra note 95, at 105 (quoting John Adams on the limits of reason).
99. B. Fa1au.LN, BENJAMIN FRANKLN: Tim AuTOBIoGRAPHY AND OTHER WRITINGs 49
(Signet Classic ed. 1961).
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view of man at the time of the Revolution foundered on the selfish realities
of the War and the 1780's.'"
The authors of the Constitution embodied this low opinion of human
nature in the document that became the centerpiece of American law. As
Gordon Wood observed some years ago, the Founders, having acknowledged
that man could not be reformed, tried to construct a government which
was adapted to checking man's sinfulness.' 0' Forrest McDonald tells us that
Hamilton embraced this idea "as a cardinal tenet of his political faith."'02
Hamilton believed that "in contriving any system of government, and fixing
the several checks and controls of the Constitution, every man ought to be
supposed a knave; and to have no other end in all his actions, but private
interest."' °3 These ideas found structural expression in our constitutional
system of checks and balances, the separation of powers, and in the Bill
of Rights.
Almost seventy-five years ago, Roscoe Pound expressed his agreement.
Pound enunciated our deep-seated skepticism that "magistrates can ever be
found to whom the royal power of administering justice without law may
be safely entrusted."'04 Modern liberalism was rooted in Hobbes as well as
in Locke, and Americans were as haunted by the bleakness of Hobbes'
vision of the "state of nature" as they were reassured by Locke's vision.
One of the great paradoxes of liberal individualism was, and still is, this
awareness that without restraint there is no freedom. The American ideal
is not simply liberty, but liberty under law. There is tension in this phrase.
Liberty under law expresses the desire to expand liberty, but also recognizes
the need for external restraint. 0
5
As Auerbach observed in Justice Without Law?, the more extreme our
concentration on liberty for the individual, the more we need protection
against predatory individuals. Auerbach wrote:
The dependence of Americans upon law, and their apprehension
about it, are reciprocal. The exercise of freedom, channeled into
the acquisitive pursuit of wealth, requires the vigorous assertion of
individual rights, which law protects. It also assures incessant con-
flict between competing individuals, who are virtually unrestrained
100. See G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 393-429; F. McDONALD, supra note 18, at 143-183.
101. G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 429.
102. See F. MCDONALD, ALEXAN1DER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPnY 35 (Norton ed. 1979).
103. See id. at 35-36 (quoting Hamilton on the proper structure of government).
104. Pound, supra note 74, at 638. Is this the source of Auerbach's title?
105. In describing the "Liberal version" of the "ideology of legal science" in the period
from 1870 to 1920, Robert Gordon noted the bar's acceptance of its role in support of this
assumption. He wrote:"[T]he lawyer was to clarify and make definite the boundaries within
which state and individual action must remain to assure maximum autonomy for all, to keep
individuals and the state from going outside their spheres, but to remove all restrictions on
free action within them;...." R. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of
American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 97
(G. Geison ed. 1983).
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by any purpose beyond self-aggrandizement. The Darwinian jungle
is filled with the excitement of the hunt, but it is a scary place
because the hunters simultaneously are hunted. 10
To what purpose would one person produce or accumulate property
unless society would prevent others from taking it from him? How enjoyable
would freedom be if one's life and possessions were subject to the will of
any stronger neighbor? A society that adopted liberal individualism as its
organizing principle needed law more than a traditional communitarian
society in which status, custom, and the pressure of traditional institutions
provided limits to private action.'07
This awareness of the need for external restraint goes far toward
explaining why laws have proliferated in America, and makes comprehen-
sible the fact that laymen have generally reconciled themselves to the loss
of the unbridled autonomy their individualist principles might otherwise
urge them to seek. The more negative the society's vision of human nature,
the more acutely society will feel the need for limits.
For Americans, the recession of religion, the confrontation with slavery,
the ugliness of industrialization, the rise of Freud, and the experience of
twentieth. century totalitarianism have all reinforced Hobbes and undercut
Locke's Enlightenment confidence.
B. Lawyers Supply Restraint: "The Indispensable Physic"
"It is with law as with physic," one mid-nineteenth century critic
grudgingly wrote of the profession, "the less we have to do with it the
better: both commodities being but a negative good, if not a positive evil.
Still, so long as diseases and discord disturb the social fabric, pacification
and pills seem to be indispensable .. ."103 This passage is remarkable for
the author's reluctant recognition that a contentious American society needs
lawyers. The passage is also interesting for its assumption that "discord"
existed independently of lawyers-a concession not all critics have been
willing to make-and for his acknowledgment that lawyers "pacify" discord.
The critic's particular quarrel was with the price lawyers demanded for their
services-"merciless harpies" as he labels them. Given the propensity of
nineteenth century conflict in much of America to result in bloodshed if
not "pacified" by someone, the role the author assigned to lawyers was an
important source of professional strength.
106. J. ALTERBAcH, supra note 6, at 141; see also Walker, Introductory Lecture On the
Dignity of the Law as a Profession, in P. MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AmERICA: FRoM
INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIvI VWAR 240 (1962).
107. Hobbes wrote graphically about this darker side of liberalism and many Americans
lived it in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
108. Legerdemain of Law-Craft, supra note 28, at 529-30. Bloomfield notes that the image
of lawyers was changing in the same direction in the 1840's. M. BLOOMPIELD, supra note 89,
at 136-90. Even Honestus acknowledged the necessity of law. Honestus, supra note 28, at 245,
249.
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Defenders of the profession have generally been satisfied to accept even
such ambiguous praise. One nineteenth century essayist agreed. "No doubt
it would be a happy state of society in which lawyers could be dispensed
with; for it would be that perfect state in which laws themselves would be
superfluous;... Let men cease to be contentious and be always ready to
do right without compulsion, and lawyers will not trouble them."' 1 9
C. Reason and Passion
As Daniel Howe has explained recently, many of the arguments in
support of the Constitution put forward by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay
in the Federalist Papers assumed that the human personality was com-
pounded of prudence, reason, and passion, which formed a hierarchy of
conscious motivation. Unfortunately, passion was the strongest faculty and
reason the weakest. Howe argues that "[t]hroughout The Federalist appeal
is made to immutable scientific laws of human behavior illustrated by
historical examples and confirmed by the Americans' own experiment in
free government."" 0 The purpose of political science was to devise me-
chanisms of government that would reinforce the faculty of reason against
passion, which constantly struggled to break through rational restraint.
Suggesting that lawyers were perceived as serving the same function in
society as reason did in the individual does not unreasonably stretch the
metaphor. Indeed, this suggestion was an essential element, of Tocqueville's
portrait of the legal profession in America. As reason checks excesses in
individuals, lawyers' reasoning in their method of approaching decisions,
and their natural conservatism restrained precipitous action in the social
body. The Constitution is full of mechanical attempts at strengthening
reason against passion through the incorporation of restraint into our
fundamental law, and lawyers have drawn strength from their role as
reasoning restrainers of passion."'
The importance of reason to a post-Enlightenment, liberal society cannot
be overemphasized. Rationality and the relationship between reason and
passion, between law and disorder, drew the attention of late eighteenth
century Americans and has remained central to understanding American
attitudes toward law. For our society, reason has played a central role in
defining law, and this fact has affected the way laymen viewed lawyers.
In characterizing the major features of American law in the twentieth
century, Lawrence Friedman has written:
109. The Morals and Utility of Lawyers, 7 WESTERN L.J. 1, 10-11 (1849).
110. Howe, The Political Psychology of The Federalist, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 485, 491
(1987).
Ill. A plausible argument can be made that the diffusion of passion is the primary
purpose of ritualized dispute resolution. One measure of the success or failure of such a
system is its ability to soothe or wear out the disputants, thereby reducing passion to calm or
to exhaustion. It is the legal profession's service in this respect which lawyers often cite as
one important feature of their utility to the community.
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There is, . . in the 20th century mind, a great straining toward
rationality. This trait, which seems fairly general in the western
world, has a particularly virulent American form.... This state of
mind is part of the general debris of a world-wide movement of
recent centuries that can be called, for want of a better name,
rationalism. Rationalism has been central to Western thought, at
least since the Industrial Revolution, if not before." 2
Friedman might have added that given the experience of twentieth
century humanity with the seductive and widespread power of irrationality,
our determination to cling to reason and the restraint reason promises has
been progressively intensified.
Who rules a rational age? Is it the reasonable person or the reasoning
person? The modern drive for rationality like all of the other factors this
essay has addressed works for and against lawyers. The drive for rationality
works for lawyers because they are masters of reasoning. Spotting reasons
and giving reasons are at the core of what lawyers do. Reasoning is at the
heart of what law schools teach, and reason is the sine qua non of judging
and legislating. Persuasion is in essence merely the process of selecting and
presenting reasons which appeal to the listener. The presence or absence of
"good" reasons differentiates "good" from "bad" law. Especially in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, lawyers claimed logic and
reason to be at the core, the very essence of law, and themselves its
master."3 How could this dedication to reasoning, the self-consciously salient
feature of the common-law method, not have a powerful appeal both for
the individuals and for the age Friedman describes?
However, distinguishing "reasoning" from "reasonable" is possible. To
say that the American mind finds the lawyer's determination to give reasons
appealing is not necessarily to say that American minds affirm the reasons
lawyers give. While the legal profession has assured the lay public that there
was true magic in the method, there were always some anxious to proclaim
that lawyers' reasoning was no more truly magical than other magicians'
illusions.
In 1836, Robert Rantoul reacted to Blackstone's famous dictum that
the common law was the perfection of human reason with a popular
indictment of the quality of the common law's "reason."
The common law is the perfection of human reason,-just as
alcohol is the perfection of sugar. The subtle spirit of the common
law is reason double distilled, till what was wholesome and nutritive
becomes rank poison. Reason is sweet and pleasant to the unso-
phisticated intellect; but this sublimated perversion of reason be-
112. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 48, at 664.
113. One could conjure many names to support this proposition but three will suffice:
William Blackstone, James Kent, and Joseph Story.
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wilders, and perplexes, and plunges its victims into mazes of error.1 1 4
In part, the legal profession invited this distinction between common
reason and lawyers' reason. Legal reasoning, the bar proclaimed, was
different from ordinary reasoning. Law was a science. Law was complex
and one must be trained to think like a lawyer before one could fathom
lawyers' logic. One dictionary definition of "reasonable" is: "amenable,
conformable, or agreeable to reason; just; rational." If the lawyer's reason
is different from the layman's reason, does not the bar's reasoning become
to the layman, by definition, anti-rational? Would it not appear a corruption
of reasoning to those who, unlike Franklin, refused to accept the inherently
instrumental character of human reason?
1 5
What if the lawyers' reasoning leads to different conclusions from the
reasoning of nonlawyers? In an age as dependent on reason as our own,
what place would the popular mind reserve for false reasoners? What
consequences would a profession that bent the tool of reason to unreasonable
and selfish ends suffer? In the final analysis, the lawyer's perverse reasoning
may appear to laymen a corruption of rationality, which goes far toward
demonstrating the fallibility of the only guide left to a people cut off from
other traditional sources of authority, John Locke and early modern lib-
eralism to the contrary notwithstanding.
Both republicans and eighteenth century liberals believed that there was
a divinely created order to the universe, and a place for man and his society
within that order. Republicans and liberals believed God gave man the tool
of reason to allow him to discover that order and to translate it into human
society as law. The effect of bad reasoning by the bar might be expected
to strike these laymen as especially perverse. Not only did bad reasoning
lead to wrong conclusions, but bad reasoning also threatened to undermine
the authority of reason itself. Nonlawyers could see in legal reasoning a
determination to prevent the embodiment of natural justice in substantive
law by undermining the reliability of the only means available to human
beings for recognizing natural law when they saw it, Locke's reason.
114. Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4, 1836), in J. ZAINALDIN, LAW IN ANTEBELLUM
SocmTY: LEGAl. CHANGE AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION 87 (1983). See also Wells, supra note 65,
at 1-2.
115. Honestus attacked lawyers' reason, and argued that:
'[V]ariety of views' is the slough of the law; and the greatest part of those 'views'
arise merely from the sophistry introduced by lawyers; for the more divisions,
subdivisions, distinctions, and vague indefinite ideas that are introduced into any
controversy, the better for them. In short, the whole bundle of perplexities originate
from the metaphysical pleadings of this 'order,' they being studious to show a cause
in as many shades as fancy can picture it; and very often the most simple cases are
thrown into such a 'variety of views,' as to become a jumble of intricacies. But the
principal part of this parade is mere pageantry of profession, calculated to perplex
the jury, and deceive the wondering crowd.
Honestus, supra note 28, at 283.
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V. LAW AS RELIGION: LAWYER POSITISM OR LAY NATURAL LAW?
A. Indeterminacy Versus Faith
There is another aspect to the layman's dependence on and suspicion
of legal reasoning. Lawyers deny certainty as well as simplicity. Their
professional behavior is a perpetual denial of the existence of "simple
truths" and a constant reminder that both human beings and the universe
they inhabit are harder to understand than most of us would like to believe.
Every proposition is open to argument. 116 As Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote long ago in reaction against the mechanical jurisprudence of the
1880's: "[Tihe logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is an
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man."" 17 Holmes' statement might
be taken as the modern lawyer's credo. How would this idea affect Amer-
icans who continued to believe with much of the rest of mankind that
positive law was made in the image of natural law and that law could and
should reflect the divine order?
Of course, formal articulation of such a relativist and instrumental view
of law came relatively late in the nineteenth century. Lawyers, however,
had acted upon the principle from the beginning. In the universe of
eighteenth and nineteenth century conceptions of law, lawyers' willingness
to argue any side of a case for money was taken as a culpable display of
dishonesty and avarice. Either the advocate was incompetent and unable to
evaluate h is clients' affairs in consonance with "true" rules of law, or the
advocate was dishonest enough to make arguments against what he knew
those rules to be." 8 Lay belief in certainty and natural law compelled a
negative view of lawyers.
As long as lawyers remained silent about their true role as manipulators
of law and accepted their role as "discoverers" of law, "honest" lawyers
could bask in the law's reflected glow. They were connected to God as
116. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 278.
117. H. COMMAGER, THE AMERcAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERicAN THouGHT
AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880's 386 (1950). Compare Honestus, supra note 28, at 282-84.
118. Sharswood addressed this charge in 1854.
That lawyers are as often the ministers of injustice as of justice is the common
accusation in the mouth of gainsayers against the profession. It is said there must
be a right and a wrong side to every lawsuit. In the majority of cases it must be
apparent to the advocate, on which side the truth and justice of the cause lie; yet
he will maintain, and often with the appearance of warmth and earnestness, that
side which he must know to be unjust, and the success of which will be a wrong to
the opposite party.
G. SEURswooD, supra. note 25, at 24-25. His response is clear but would hardly have appealed
to laymen who believed in absolute justice. He wrote that a dispute must be decided "...
upon the evidence, and upon the principles of law applicable to the facts .... No court or
jury are invested with any arbitrary discretion to determine a cause according to their mere
notions of justice." Id.
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surely as was the clergy. Consequently, the conscious betrayal of "justice"
by "bad" lawyers, was an offense against God and the natural order as
well as against man." 9 Good lawyers, those on the "right" side of a case,
interpreted law consistently with the natural order. Good lawyers were
instruments of God because they interpreted God to man. There was room
in such a universe for "legal science," that is, the discovery and application
of pre-existing, natural principles. There could be little understanding of
adversarial advocacy, however, since such advocacy depended upon the
existence of competing perspectives or principles. Honestus made this point
when he wrote: "Two lawyers disputing cannot alter the established prin-
ciples of law, though they may bewilder a Judge. They may perplex the
mind, but they cannot inform the judgment."'' 20 To make matters worse, if
the advocate for the wrong side won, then future cases that followed that
advocate's lead would be wrong as well. The evil wrought could extend
indefinitely into the future. Stare decisis provided stability at a cost because
it urged courts to follow bad decisions as well as good ones.
Even eighteenth century lawyers, men like Hamilton, who worked with
law day in and day out, could not have accepted the lay view of either law
or themselves. Law for lawyers must surely have been positivist and instru-
mental even before these words were used to describe or lawyers were willing
to acknowledge this reality publicly. Lawyers were sensitive to the institu-
tional imperatives of the common-law method in ways laymen were not.
Lawyers lived within a system of assumptions that sometimes put institu-
tional values ahead of just results.
119. Harold Berman has recently set out the distinction between natural law theory and
positivism succinctly:
Classical natural law theory, ... is based ultimately on a concept of either fate or
providence; it presupposes that the universe itself, including human life, is not only
existential but also normative and that it contains an objective standard by which
the legality of positive laws are to be judged. Classical legal positivism, in turn,
rests ultimately on a concept of the absolute lawmaking power of government; like
natural law theory, however, it presupposes the legitimacy of the state and, in
addition, the fundamental objectivity and consistency of the body of laws through
which the state exercises its authority.
Berman, Individualistic and Communitarian Theories of Justice: An Historical Approach, 21
U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 549, 552 (1988) (footnotes omitted). He went on elsewhere in the article
to explain the effect these differences would have upon people's experience with the legal
system.
Before the professionalization and systematization of law, more allowance was
given for people's attitudes and beliefs and for their unconscious ideas, their processes
of mythical thought .... Rights and duties were not bound to the letter of legal
texts but instead were a direct manifestation of community values.... In this type
of legal order, law is not something that is consciously and continuously made and
remade by central authorities; there may be occasional legislation, but for the most
part law is something that grows out of the patterns and norms of behavior, the
folkways and the mores of the community.
Id. at 564-565.
120. Honestus, supra note 28, at 255.
AMERICAN LA WYER'S IMAGE
The importance placed upon these and the other mentioned values
illustrates another fundamental difference of outlook between lawyers and
nonlawyers. Lawyers were much less confident that the intuition of human
beings was a dependable base upon which to erect a just society. 12' Con-
sequently, there was an inherent contradiction between lay natural concep-
tions of law and the positivist, process-oriented, instrumental conception of
law that came to dominate the consciousness of the legal profession.
This conflict between popular conceptions of law and the law as
practiced by lawyers in the American adversary system must have been
apparent to thoughtful laymen from the beginning of the modern era. Only
when lawyers began talking about what they did in the new language of
late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurisprudence, however, did most
laymen have the opportunity to understand what many lawyers had known
all along: lawyers did not discover law, they created it.' 22 As a result,
laymen could now see that lawyers were not acting dishonestly when lawyers
made arguments on behalf of their clients that the lawyers might not believe.
Lawyers could offer conflicting interpretations in the same case in good
faith. This benefit, however, was purchased at the cost of undermining the
legitimacy of the common law itself. If law were nothing more than lawyers'
arguments adopted by judges, why should judges and lawyers alone make
these decisions?
When jurisprudence acknowledged that lawyers made law, jurisprudence
validated the suspicions of those who had explained the perversity of some
legal results by hypothesizing the separation of natural justice from lawyer-
administered law. Rantoul offered a poetic image of this divergence.
While the common law sheds no light, but rather darkness visible,
that serves but to discover sights of woe,-justice rises, like the Sun
of Righteousness, with healing on his wings, scatters the doubts
that torture without end, dispels the mists of scholastic subtlety,
and illuminates with the light that lighteth every man that cometh
into the world. Older, nobler, clearer, and more glorious, then, is
everlasting justice, than ambiguous, base-born purblind, perishable
common law.' 2
When nonlawyers understood that lawyers had relinquished their claimed
connection to God and the natural order, there was no "natural" reason
left to defer to the bar. Consequently, all that legitimated lawyers' power
121. Sharswood speaks the lawyer's fear of unbounded discretion. It could only "constitute
the most appalling of despotisms." G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 25, at 25.
122. I do not mean to suggest that most laymen did in fact understand the difference
between their view of law and the view held by lawyers because jurisprudents began to describe
the difference more clearly. Rather, I believe that laymen had realized for some time that
lawyers intended to act the way they did and that they could justify their actions on
jurisprudential grounds. This discovery must have made it appear that the profession was not
only wrong about the nature of law, but purposely wrong.
123. Rantoul, supra note 113, at 86. See also Wells, supra note 65, at 1-2.
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and status was social necessity, a negative and shifting source of authority.
Substitution of positivism for natural law theory worked both for and
against the legal profession as did the other developments this essay has
discussed. If positivism undermined the moral foundation of lawyer's power,
it also increased that power by making laymen more dependent on lawyers.
The lawyers' ability to evaluate law became unique. Nonlawyers in the past
had been able to participate in the evaluation of law. With the divorce of
law from nature and morality, the connections between non-legal fields of
expertise and the law were irretrievably severed. Only the opinions of legal
specialists could be authoritative. As a result, the legal profession could
consign its competitors to the fringes of legal discussion. Without the
connection between God, nature, and law, the expertise of clergymen,
philosophers, and other intellectuals could no longer validate their partici-
pation in legal discourse on equal terms with lawyers. Nonlawyers' beliefs
and arguments became increasingly irrelevant to lawyers, as lawmakers
described a legal system which was created not by God but by man. In
such a legal system the law was the province of legal experts making and
logically evaluating law. This was a world for lawyers, not laymen.
Of course, this process of displacement reinforced the appropriation of
law as the lawyer's exclusive domain. The substitution of positivism for
natural law also earned for the bar the undying enmity of those thoughtful,
articulate, and influential individuals who continued to believe that they
had something important to say about the relationship between God, law,
and man. As Roscoe Pound suggested years ago, nonlawyers' feelings of
alienation from lawyers' law, and their anger at the closing of the law to
nonlawyers may account for anti-lawyer expressions by clerics, especially
the repetition of the question: can lawyers act morally.'2
The general public both accepted and rejected the profession's argument
and its appropriation of the law. Positivism appeals to doubters, not to
persons of faith, and most Americans doubt, but they also believe. Because
of this paradox, Americans are not entirely comfortable with natural law
theory, but neither are they entirely comfortable with the uncertain and
shifting nature of positivist law.
By training, lawyers lean toward doubt. The familiar first year law
student's determined search for law in doctrine-based absolutes slowly gives
way under the pressure of faculty prodding to the patterns of analysis and
argumentation encapsulated in the phrase "thinking like a lawyer." Each
year, we watch our first year law students struggle through a period of
disorientation to eventual understanding. In this annual cycle, one can
discern broadly held lay attitudes toward law and the discomfort generated
as these attitudes are attacked. Law students experience this discomfort as
psychological stress as they are acculturated as lawyers. Similar feelings
must also have been experienced by reflective laymen as they have endured
throughout our history countless "educational" contacts with lawyers and
124. See Pound, supra note 103, at 632.
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the legal system. But for nonlawyers the process is never completed. Non-
lawyers never arrive at the third year students' resignation and acceptance
of the rules of the game. If one can go neither forward nor back, one 'can
rage.
Although most Americans have come to accept the liberal values of
diversity and pluralism, Americans have not necessarily abandoned their
own search for absolutes and resent being told that the law embodies none.
America's broad pluralism amounts for most Americans to little more than
a willingness to tolerate passively one another's "mistakes." The legal system
and the lawyers who serve it go much farther. They affirm toleration
instrumentally as a working principle for social peacekeeping. Moreover,
they affirm toleration because lawyers have learned to question the existence
of abstract truths. This result is primarily the consequence of legal training,
although the work lawyers perform also reinforces a relativist view of the
world. Lawyers focus on process in part because in their professional view
competing truths reflect incomplete formulations and often have equal
legitimacy.' 25 The legal system must function in this way, and the system
needs lawyers precisely because, although "truths" may inform action by
nonlawyers, the absence of consensus on the content of these truths prevents
their embodiment in law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The negative image of lawyers in America is one piece of a complicated
intellectual puzzle. In this essay I have tried to relate ideas about the legal
profession to fundamental intellectual forces at work in eighteenth and
nineteenth century America. Among the most important of these were the
competing ideologies of republicanism and liberalism. The conflicting pres-
sures produced by the tension between these competing visions account for
much of the intensity of feeling about lawyers in American life. The same
tensions also offer insights into the sources of the profession's power and
durability. Although the collision of these paradigms is most apparent in
the years from the American Revolution to the Civil War, republicanism
and liberalism have both continued, one waxing and one waning, to exert
an influence over our cultural consciousness.
Relating attitudes about lawyers to republicanism and liberalism will
help us to understand the unevenness of hostile popular sentiment about
the bar, connecting anti-lawyer expressions to larger developments. It may
also help us to understand the extent to which criticism of lawyers reflects
dissatisfaction with the ideology and structural role of lawyers as opposed
to the way individual lawyers have practiced their profession. This under-
standing should encourage us to consider whether public attitudes toward
125. This idea is at the heart of John Stuart Mill's liberal classic On Liberty. See also
Richardson, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the Norfolk Bar (Feb. 25, 1837),
in P. MILLER, THE LEaAL Ms-D IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CM WAR 233
(Cornell 1969); Jackson, supra note 32, at 278.
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the bar have been related to deviant or professionally appropriate behavior
by lawyers.
Identification with extreme individualism alienated republicans. But this
identification also aligned the bar with the dominant American paradigm
of aggressive individualism and enhanced the importance of the ritualized
dispute resolution process over which lawyers presided. The bar gained allies
among supporters of liberal individualism only to alienate these supporters
as the profession emerged over the course of the nineteenth century as an
intrusive elite with perceived pretensions to domination.
By accepting the egalitarian admission requirements forced on the
profession by the Jacksonians, the bar succeeded in diffusing some of the
popular hostility which the expansion of law generated. But lawyers never
formulated a truly democratic vision for the profession. Rather, they ac-
cepted the role Tocqueville and the Founders had assigned them. This
conception of their role encouraged identification of lawyers with the power
of the few against the many. Moreover, it would eventually lead the
profession to become so identified with minority rights as to result in further
anti-lawyer outbreaks in the late nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries.
Lawyers, however, could always make the mass of Americans hesitate
in the determination to enforce the majority's will by reminding their fellow
citizens that behind the bar was the law. That law, which the bar served,
was the only external restraint available to a society which combined a
commitment to liberal individualism with a fundamentally pessimistic view
of human nature-a combination which posited the necessity of external
restraint while destroying the community-based, non-law sources of such
restraint.
This explanation suggests that ambivalence about lawyers reflects a deep
popular ambivalence about law itself. For Americans law both rankles and
reassures; law is resented and embraced. This essential paradox is captured
in the phrase "liberty under law." Americans pursue liberty, but recognize
that freedom for themselves is made possible only by the existence of
restraints on others. Most Americans realize that individualism can only
exist under community protection.
The bar's mixed destiny in America has been to serve both freedom
and authority, to struggle constantly to keep these complementary elements
in dynamic equilibrium. Much of the popular criticism of lawyers reflects
the fact that in particular cases, lawyers often have appeared too dedicated
to one or the other of these ideals. But people have experienced their
personal contacts with lawyers more often as constricting rather than lib-
erating. Most Americans have encountered the authority aspect of law.
They have resented this aspect because they have sought a more complete
autonomy than authority permits. Americans have also resented the au-
thority aspect of the law because they believe that authority has been
perverted by being turned to the service of lawyers instead of the community.
The liberty which the legal system and lawyers help to make possible is
abstract. Freedom is a mosaic produced by cementing in place countless
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tiles, each of which is experienced individually as autonomy-defeating. Not
surprisingly, only the most perceptive people are able to discern, in the
actions of lawyers a dedication to freedom.
The ambiguous position of the legal profession in America is also the
result of a fundamental disagreement between laymen and lawyers over their
respective conceptions of law. Belief in freedom under law has been a
central tenet of our culture for good reason. But nonlawyers insist that the
law upon which they rely embody moral absolutes-that it be more than
what the lawyers say it is. Nonlawyers resist seeing the law as process and
search for eternal principles. Precisely because everything else in their lives
is in motion, Americans long for a simple authoritative rationality in their
laws. When lawyers' conduct, dictated by the adversary system and a
relativist and instrumental perception of law, challenges this determination,
it generates anger against the bar. The profession's insistence on the inde-
terminate, positivist character of law in a society devoted to the worship of
a nature-based jurisprudence has had an effect similar to that created by
pulling back the curtain on the Wizard of Oz. Not surprisingly, when
lawyers encounter a deeply felt desire on the part of most Americans to
continue believing in the Wizard, lawyers' actions generate consternation
and popular anger.
Ironically, each of these intellectual pieces has produced affirmative and
negative feelings about lawyers, and the public still seems unable to decide
which should predominate. In the end, what people think of lawyers
probably reflects their attitude toward particular facets of the profession's
message and the level of sophistication the lay decisionmaker brings to the
task of observation and decision. Those who see the world as a place of
subtle shadings and complex variety are less likely to attack lawyers for
entertaining a similar opinion.
All of these elements contribute complexity and diversity to popular
attitudes toward lawyers. They account, at least in part, for the discontinuity
between what Americans have written and said about the bar, and the way
they have treated lawyers. They also suggest that lawyers can have little
affirmative impact on lay opinions about the profession as long as the
intellectual sources of such attitudes persist. More than anything else the
continuing influence of conflicting principles creates popular ambivalence
about the bar.
Lawyers do live their lives in America along a cultural fault. Both
lawyers and their critics should recognize this fact. Lawyers should look
deeper into the charges made against the profession and focus less concern
on the superficial sources of this criticism. Nonlawyers should understand
that many of their indictments of the bar are criticisms of the world they,
not their lawyers, have made. In order to do without lawyers, Americans
would have to do without law as they know it. We cannot have the rule
of law and reason without accepting, to some extent, the rule of lawyers.
Tocqueville saw this more clearly than most of us now understand.
Americans may dream Auerbach's dream of a communitarian America
capable of doing justice without law and without lawyers. But when they
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awaken, Americans will still find themselves in a Hobbesian universe until
they, not their lawyers, choose to remake it.
